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INTRODUCTION

John Holmwood, Gurminder K. Bhambra and Sue Scott

The publication of the Government’s Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper; Building Stronger, More United Communities on March 14th bombastically promotes Britain as “one of the world’s most successful multi-ethnic, multi-faith societies” (page 7) and declares that, “over many centuries, we have welcomed migrants into Britain” (page 10).1

A month is a long time in politics. Reflection on the 25-year anniversary in April of the Stephen Lawrence murder – and, in particular, a three-part documentary by the BBC2 -showed that the institutional racism identified by the Macpherson Inquiry had not been laid to rest. Equally, reportage by the Guardian’s Amelia Gentleman showed the shameful treatment by the Home Office of the Windrush generation of Commonwealth citizens and their children who had become resident in Britain.3 These reports had been ignored by the Prime Minister and other ministers, but the coincidence of a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London, designed to reinforce the country’s new outward looking post-Brexit spirit, brought a different, inward looking, mean-spiritedness into focus.

It is not possible to read the Green Paper outside this context. The attitudes that have formed Government policies over the last decade have involved increasing antagonism toward immigration as Conservative party politicians sought to counter the rise of UKIP. The offer by David Cameron of a referendum on leaving the European Union was designed to lance that boil, but instead it spread the infection. The opposition to immigration was not simply about new immigration from EU countries, but also about what Enoch Powell had called in his infamous 1968 ‘rivers of blood speech’ (also having its 50th anniversary in April), the ‘immigrant descended’. (He meant the non-white immigrant descended).4 As in the US after Donald Trump’s Presidential victory, the vote for Brexit was explained as a vote by the ‘left behind’, specifically a white working class that had lost out through deindustrialisation and neoliberal globalisation. This was an account that left out Britain’s non-white citizens who experienced higher levels of disadvantage.5 Moreover, a recent review of studies of the impact of immigration on wages and on local services has shown that the former has been less than

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a penny per hour, and the latter has been minimal with perceived pressures on services deriving from
government cuts.  

In fact, the Green Paper’s celebration of Britain as a ‘successful, multi-ethnic, multi-faith society’ is
belied by the earlier claim by David Cameron in his February 2011 speech at the Munich Security
Conference that ‘multi-culturalism’ had failed. He identified a problem of integration where, “we
have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism,
we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from
the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.
We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter
to our values.”

It is precisely such unsupported and politically expedient claims that have contributed to a wider
public anxiety about multi-culturalism and the ethnic minorities with which it is associated. Such
claims are themselves an obstacle to integration. For example, the Observer newspaper recently
reported a YouGov poll finding that 43% of respondents expected relationships between different
UK communities to deteriorate over the next few years compared to 14% who thought there would
be improvement. More than two-thirds of Conservative Leave voters believed multiculturalism is not
working.

It is this understanding of modern Britain that informs the Green Paper. It describes the challenges of
integration and points to the responsibilities of migrants, including by implication those of the non-
white immigrant descended. It also outlines problems of segregation and the importance of social
mixing. The Green Paper associates these as problems produced by ethnic minorities. Nowhere are
homogenous white British communities subject to comment or proposed policy intervention. Indeed,
as Danny Dorling sets out in his contribution to this issue, the British governing class is itself the
most self-segregated in its residence, its use of private schooling and its employment in top positions
in law, politics and media. Indeed, the Green Paper challenges the mono-cultural concentration of
some ethnic minority communities yet it is among the white British population that the greatest
self-segregation is found. As Jenny Phillimore and Nando Sigona argue it is their choices that
produce the segregation of ethnic minorities at whom the finger of blame is pointed. Indeed, Britain’s
ethnic minority population, they argue, shows a strong drive toward social mixing and desire to live
in diverse, rather than mono-cultural, communities. The obstacles are structural, not cultural.

Phillimore and Sigona set out how the creation of an ‘hostile environment for illegal migrants’ blurs
the line between illegal and legal migration as well as demeaning those who came to Britain as
Commonwealth citizens fully exercising their rights to do so. Legislation since 2010 has required
employers, landlords, schools, banks and doctors to check people’s immigration status and this has
fallen most onerously on visible minorities, not all of whom have papers that have come to be held
necessary to corroborate status.

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article/economic-impacts-immigration-uk.


www.suttontrust.com/research-paper/leading-people-2016-education-background/.

10 See, for example, Semyonov, Moshe and Glikman, Anya (2009) Ethnic Residential Segregation, Social
In fact, as Lucy Mayblin shows, this is not new. There have been moments of hospitality, but they have often been late in any given crisis and always grudgingly conceded. Britain was a reluctant signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, for example, and the exclusionary impulse continues today. In fact, we might conclude from the overview provided in her article that Britain has a long history of seeking to avoid being seen as too generous, too welcoming, lest people seek asylum here.

Two of our contributions address the general issue of the evidence in the Green Paper. In the first, Mark Monaghan and Jo Ingold look at the very role of Green Papers in the formation of government policy. Green Papers act as discussion papers for policy that is in the process of formation (the reason why we believe engaging with the consultation on this Green Paper is so important). They set out a five-stage model for the translation of evidence into policy. However, despite frequent mentions in the Green Paper of a commitment to discovering ‘what works’, their conclusion is that the Green Paper privileges particular kinds of evidence based on reportage and audit over others and there is a danger this will be replicated in the White Paper that follows.

Indeed, it looks as if the current Green Paper fails at their first stage of translation. This is the definition of the substantive problem at hand, and, in this case, it is taken from Dame Louise Casey’s Review into Opportunity and Integration from December 2016. As Stephen Crossley sets out, she has a long and problematic relationship with the collection of evidence in support of policy development and has rarely hidden her indifference to empirical research, misusing government research, and inventing statistics to support her position. Despite a reputation for ‘telling it like it is’ her approach could be better characterised as ‘telling it as politicians want it to be’.

Echoing David Cameron’s Munich speech, Dame Louise Casey begins her review with the statement that among her findings was that of “cultural and religious practices in communities that are not only holding some of our citizens back but run contrary to British values and sometimes our laws” (page 5). The puzzle is that there is plenty of social scientific evidence to challenge this view. Some of it finds its way into the Green Paper, but only as contradictory and unresolved statements. For example, mono-cultural segregation, negative attitudes toward women and failure to learn English are all indicated as potential issues associated with Muslim communities, yet it is also acknowledged that “a higher proportion of British Muslims identifies as British than the population as a whole” (page 57).

As Ajmal Hussain and Nasar Meer observe the main organising principle for integration is that of fundamental British values. These are not themselves open to consultation and they are derived from the Government’s counter-terrorism Prevent strategy. Yet, there is little evidence that different cultural practices of Britain’s ethnic minority communities are in conflict with fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and religious tolerance. Indeed, the social and civic engagement among ‘integrated’ Muslim communities - in for example the response to the tragedy of Grenfell Tower and aftermath of the Manchester Arena bombing - did not require the organising authority of the state or invocations of ‘fundamental British values’. There is little doubt that the focus on cultural practices as if they were in conflict, contributes to growing prejudice and can only contribute to the alienation of presently integrated Muslim communities.

Indeed, Therese O’Toole shows how the Green Paper identifies extremism as an obstacle to the achievement of integration and enfolds the goals of Counter Extremism into the concerns of integration. Not only is Counter Extremism posited in the Green Paper as a strategy for tackling inequalities, it is also presented as key to the promotion of rights, freedoms and shared values that are foundational to the government’s integration strategy. This involves an attempt to re-frame
the meaning of counter-extremism to disassociate it from the Prevent strategy, something that is fraught with difficulties, especially given that both have been criticised for their negative impact on both rights and freedoms, especially for Muslim citizens.

The overwhelming emphasis in the Green Paper is on ethnicity and failures of ethnic minorities to integrate. As Stephen Ashe argues, this is presented in individualistic terms of deficits on the part of individuals – whether of aspirations or failure to speak English – without addressing the structural and cultural issues of racism as barriers to equal opportunities. Yet recent surveys of Asian and Black employees reveal that significant numbers have experienced racism at work. Indeed, the government has handed responsibility over to public sector managers to determine how to comply with their new duties, which is particularly ironic when the surveys identify managers as being main perpetrators of workplace racism.

As Alita Nandi argues, the Green Paper’s narrow and unhelpful focus on ethnicity denies other disadvantaged groups a voice and fails to recognise the barriers to their success. Second, this promotes the false notion that ethnic groups are homogeneous. All ethnic groups are also comprised of individuals with different gender, age, social class, sexual orientation, disability (or differently abled). While gender differences within ethnic groups are mentioned in a few places, in general wider issues of intersectionality go unrecognised.

Moreover, the politics of austerity since the financial crisis of 2008 has meant that community services have experienced very significant cuts, whether that is to youth services, libraries, housing or other aspects of infrastructure. Indeed, one aspect of the Green Paper is to emphasise the importance of local resources that government polices have seriously degraded. This finds its most surreal aspect when reference is made to the bonding that can occur by action to maintain local services against threatened cuts: “Community ownership of assets, such as parks, pubs, libraries and community centres supports strong integrated communities by catalysing social action. Saving a much-loved asset and taking part in shaping services can act as a focal point for the community and offers opportunities for people to mix and combat a ‘them and us’ mentality” (page 45).

The Green Paper is based on the belief that ethnic minority women pose both a particular problem and an opportunity to bring about civic integration for their communities, something which Sara Farris argues is an emerging policy approach across Europe. However, once again, its focus is the individual and the local level. Lack of integration thus seems, after all, to derive from these women’s poor will or inadequate background. No mention is made of the high costs of childcare in England that discourage many mothers from seeking a job, of the levels of discrimination that ethnic minority women experience in the labour market, of the badly paid and precarious jobs that are usually offered to them, of the cuts to the Adult Education Budget that have eliminated English courses, or of the closure of refuges for the victims of gender and domestic violence that make it more difficult for ethnic minority women to seek help. Discrimination against women within ethnic minority communities is what is given emphasis, rather than discrimination against ethnic minorities by the wider community.

This is particularly marked in the treatment of women from Pakistan and Bangladesh. As Katherine Charsley points out a substantial proportion of British Pakistanis are married to a partner from Pakistan. Both the Green Paper and the earlier Casey Review make prominent reference to such transnational marriages as both a symptom and cause of problematic integration. They do not, however, present a clear evidence base for this association. The findings of a recent ESRC-funded project on Marriage Migration and Integration conducted by Charsley and her colleagues suggest that the relationships between transnational marriage and integration are more diverse and nuanced, but migrant spouses also face barriers to opportunity. Proposals to provide practical information and signposting for new arrivals and increase provision of English language tuition are positive. However, the simplistic and pathologising portrayal of British Pakistani marriage practices in the Casey and
Integrated Communities reports are likely to damage integration by reinforcing prejudice and social barriers.

Throughout the Green Paper *problems of integration* are amplified with little evidence that the problems are of the form proposed. As *Maya Goodfellow shows with reference to the presumptive consequences of poor English language skills*, lack of such skills is not as extensive as is claimed and is arrived at by conflating ‘don’t speak at all’ and ‘don’t speak well’. There is also a direct association made between “learn[ing] to speak and understand our language and values” (page 11) as if the values proposed as fundamental have a uniquely British formulation and are not expressed within other languages and by other communities. It remains that individuals would like more support, but it is precisely here that government cuts to services has taken a severe toll. Instead, English language requirements have become embedded in the hostile environment to discourage migration.

In fact, once the evidence of the Green Paper is deconstructed, it is apparent that there is much that the wider community can learn from the resilience of ethnic minority communities and their participation and commitment to success, notwithstanding the barriers that are faced. A glimpse of this possibility is there in the way in which a problem of white disadvantage enters the Green Paper. Although it offers no discussion of its implications, *as Mary Brown and Stephen McKay argue*, there have been considerable improvements in the educational success of those from ethnic minority backgrounds. It is now the white working class group that does least well at school, while ethnic minorities are already more likely to gain a degree than the white population as a whole. Despite this, there is still an ethnic employment penalty. This is partly explained by the higher social class family backgrounds of the white population (for now at least), partly by lower occupational standing in the workforce, and partly by employment discrimination. Brown and Mackay’s ethnographic work with a rural white population picks up some signs of reduced educational aspirations and an orientation towards earlier rather than delayed success in the labour market. Younger white people may be experiencing the effects of more limited social mobility, compared with those from an ethnic minority background, in their views about economic rewards.

We began this piece with reference to the scandal associated with the Government’s treatment of British citizens from the Commonwealth. It is evident that the Green Paper is part of that mindset. Integration is presented as a problem because immigration is perceived as a problem. Rights and responsibilities are invoked, but the rights of non-white citizens to equally determine Britain’s political community and civic expression are not recognised. If the government really believed in the value of Britain being “one of the world’s most successful multi-ethnic, multi-faith societies”, that value would be expressed in a Green Paper that endorsed multi-culturalism and addressed the barriers to inclusion.
THE ROLE OF GREEN PAPERS IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT
- TRANSLATING EVIDENCE INTO POLICY

Mark Monaghan and Jo Ingold

The Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper is an ambitious document with the fundamental aim of providing the means to achieve the building of stronger, more united communities across England. Throughout the document there is a premium placed on how the measures proposed in the Strategy can be evaluated and what lessons can be learned to assess its potential success. This is to be cautiously welcomed bearing in mind Keynes’ somewhat timeless adage that there is nothing that governments hate more than being well informed, as it makes the process of decision-making that much harder.

Of note in the strategy is a desire to incorporate evidence into the policy process, with frequent mentions of a commitment to discovering ‘what works’. In this short article, we consider the way that evidence has been framed in the Green Paper, drawing on lessons from a perspective we call ‘Evidence Translation’ and the central role of ‘evidence translators’ within this.

Evidence-based policy?

Over recent decades, much attention has been directed towards the role of evidence in policy making. Although this has a long lineage, it was given renewed emphasis in the late 1990s by New Labour and their desire to develop policies devoid of ideology and based on the best available evidence. Since then an entire infrastructure within government has been continuously buttressed. For instance, HM Treasury’s Magenta Book provides guidance to policy makers and analysts (economists, social researchers, statisticians and operational researchers) at all levels of government (and central and local) for the design and management of evaluations of government projects, policies and programmes. The Magenta Book is a companion to HM Treasury’s Green Book. This constitutes ‘binding guidance’ for departments and government agencies undertaking economic appraisals when developing policies and programmes. This incorporates the ‘ROAMEF’ cycle (Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring, Evaluation, Feedback), intended to represent the UK policymaking process.

Despite these attempts to provide guidance for policy makers and analysts regarding the harnessing and utilisation of evidence, there is a lack of data about evidence use within government. The above publications have possibly added to, rather than alleviated, this void: the guidance is, at best, incomplete and abstract rather than reflective of the realities of policymaking. For instance, at no stage does the Magenta Book consider how policymakers can assimilate knowledge into policy.

16 Available at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20making%20in%20the%20real%20world.pdf.
Additionally, EBPM has latterly become a point of derision to some extent. For example, Michael Gove’s criticism of experts, and before that Dame Louise Casey’s notorious comment about No. 10 and EBPM being a precursor to policy inaction.

**Green Papers and Policy Development: The Role of ‘Evidence Translation’**

In the UK (and elsewhere) Green Papers serve as discussion papers for ‘proposals which are still at the formative stage’. Not all discussion papers are put on general release and many are sent to a pre-selected list of consultees, a decision usually at the discretion of the administering Department. A critical (but usually implicit) defining feature of Green Papers concerns their framing of an issue, which, in turn, influences the kinds of evidence that are deemed permissible and those that are not.

In an attempt to shed light on the process of how evidence is used in policy making (the ‘evidence-policy connection’), we have suggested a model of ‘Evidence Translation’, based on research with a large UK central government department (see Figure 1).

The model suggests that five, inter-related factors broadly shape the process of translating evidence into policy. Below we set out how these relate to the Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper:

1. **The substantive nature of the policy issue or problem determines the kind and extent of evidence used.**

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The challenge is presented as being primarily an issue about ‘a worrying number of communities, divided along race, faith or socio-economic lines’ (pp.11-1). This, in turn, leads to several factors that need to be addressed: a) the level and pace of integration; b) school segregation; c) residential segregation; d) labour market disadvantage; e) lack of English language proficiency; f) personal, religious and cultural norms, values and attitudes; g) lack of meaningful social mixing.

But how are these identified and on what grounds? Perhaps ironically, it is Dame Louise Casey’s Review\(^1\) is brought to the fore as dominant evidence upon which the Green Paper is based. Dame Casey has been a powerful policy entrepreneur and powerful broker of policy ideas since her early days as the ‘homelessness czar’ and is known for her often outspoken views on policy (as well as perhaps a relative disdain for careful evidence reviews).

2. Agenda setting and policy framing influence the search for permissible evidence.

In the *Integrated Communities Strategy*, evidence is synonymous with evaluation, it is *ex post facto*. This conflation also downplays the effort has been expended by researchers trying to shape the policy field *ex ante* through, for example, systematic reviews. Systematic reviews are prognostic as opposed to more diagnostic evaluation research. Systematic reviews aim to net and assemble nascent research in any given domain. In effect, they involve researchers undertaking a scientific stock taking exercise on any given topic and so, in theory, arguably stand the best chance of providing the evidence-base about ‘what works’ for policy decisions. It comes as something of a surprise and missed opportunity that in the Green Paper there is almost an absence of evidence from systematic review.

3. Specific filtration processes are at play in the relationship between evidence and policy.

The kinds of evidence that are deemed useful to policy makers and have powerful advocates tend to survive, whereas critical evidence falls by the wayside. Sometimes this is an issue of method. Ray Pawson highlights how because EBPM emerged from evidence-based medicine there has been a ‘fairly seamless’ adoption of a ‘gold standard’ of the randomized controlled trial (RCT) (preferably with hidden allocation) from health into other policy areas.\(^2\) Large-scale quantitative research is also favoured.

In the Green Paper (and the Casey Review) the kinds of ‘evidence’ that predominate are from powerful policy entrepreneurs e.g. the Casey Review and largely quantitative evidence from large-scale social science research in the upper echelons of the evidence hierarchy (Home Office Statistical Bulletin on Hate Crime Research; Race Disparity Audit of Public Services; British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) on Racial Prejudice; iCOCO Foundation Report on School Segregation). These suggest the privileged position of certain types of evidence that, in effect, border on reportage and audit. In our research BSAS was a powerful barometer of public opinion and, therefore, valued by Ministers and utilised by government analysts, but smaller (often qualitative) studies were less likely to survive the filtration process (in relation to the Green Paper this includes British Academy’s Collection of Essays and Case Studies Showcasing Innovative Local Integration Projects).

4. The apparatus for policy design and implementation can have a direct bearing on the kinds of evidence used and omitted.

The policy apparatus includes the legislative process, but in this dimension we also point to the importance of the *interpretation* and *re-interpretation* of the framing of the policy problem as well

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as the evidence base during the policy cycle. Effectively Green Papers set the direction of policy travel, flagging up key questions about aspects of policy that are not yet fully decided. However, there is often very little substantive change to be seen between draft proposals in a Green Paper and the resulting White Paper before it enters the legislative process. Consequently, Green Papers can operate with a somewhat one-dimensional understanding of evidence, something which could be seen as their ‘hidden’ function.

5. At the centre of the Evidence Translation model and crucial to every stage of it are ‘Evidence translators’ - government analysts or policy officials who play a decisive role in relation to each stage of the translation process.

The role of evidence translators with regard to Green Papers is critical and largely under-stated. Firstly, during the early stages of the policy process it is ‘evidence translators’ in the form of analysts that tend to undertake the ‘rapid evidence reviews’ that form the basis for many Green Papers. These reviews require civil servants to fairly quickly establish where the weight of evidence lies on particular issues. In many cases this involves reverting to ‘tried and tested’ kinds of evidence, which are often influenced by somewhat hidden evidence hierarchies.

After the Green Paper

Evidence translators are also critical at the stage of translating a range of views about issues raised in a Green Paper into the resulting White Paper. Clarity on who undertakes such tasks and what their framing of the issues, including how views and opinions on issues are weighted, is of central importance. Yet questions remain. Undoubtedly the views of some contributors are prioritised over others. How are critical views dealt with? Which kinds of evidence dominate and eventually determine the direction of policy? Submissions to consultations are largely via organisations and by individual academics and researchers. However, a key question is whose views are excluded in this process (such as individuals who are not necessarily adequately represented by a specific interest group)? At a time when ‘people-powered’ organisations (e.g. 38 Degrees and others) can facilitate individual citizens to quickly submit views to government consultations, is this kind of opinion downgraded because submissions are often similar, or is a ‘weight’ of opinion gauged as representing strong views on an issue? Only time will tell, but if the Green Paper provides the blueprint for the White Paper then it is likely to be a case of survival of the evidence that fits.
2 TELLING IT LIKE IT IS‘? A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CASEY REVIEW INTO OPPORTUNITY AND INTEGRATION

Stephen Crossley

The government’s Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper draws heavily on The Casey Review into opportunity and integration, undertaken by Dame Louise Casey, a then senior civil servant. The review is mentioned in the foreword to the Green Paper and at various points throughout the document. Two quotations from the Casey Review are highlighted and the report appears in the references three times. Perhaps the best indication of the influence of the Casey Review, however, can be found in the similarity between many of the review’s recommendations and the actions the government proposes taking in the Green Paper. By way of example, Casey called for ‘attaching more weight to British values, laws and history in our schools’, whilst the government proposes to ‘support teachers to promote British values across the curriculum’ and to include the ‘promotion of fundamental British values and integration within [Ofsted’s] new inspection arrangements’ (p14). Casey also recommends that ‘Central and local government should develop a list of indicators of a potential breakdown in integration’ (p167) and the Green Paper proposes to ‘develop a clear set of integration measures at the local and national level so that policy makers and practitioners can monitor and measure progress’ (p15).

Such synthesis is not surprising, but this does not mean that it should be welcomed. Louise Casey has a long and problematic relationship with the collection of evidence in support of policy development which should concern us, and which should cast doubt on the validity of the recommendations she sets out in her review. Despite a reputation for ‘telling it like it is’ Casey’s approach could also be characterised as ‘telling it as politicians want it to be’. Her review into opportunity and integration, her last major piece of work before leaving the civil service, does not break this mould.

Casey has rarely hidden her indifference (at best) to empirical research. In her infamous after-dinner speech in 2005 Casey was reported to have rhetorically asked ‘Topic for the evening. Research: help or hindrance?’ before answering ‘Hindrance, thanks very much’. One of the most widely-publicised comments of the evening was ‘there is an obsession with evidence-based policy ... If No 10 says bloody ’evidence-based policy’ to me once more I’ll deck them one and probably get unemployed’. Following criticism of the government’s misuse of research statistics in relation to the initial figure of 120,000 ‘troubled families’, Casey argued that ‘a lot is made of this, in retrospect, which needn’t be’. In 2012, DCLG published her report Listening to Troubled Families which highlighted the problems faced and caused by 16 families that Casey had interviewed. Some academics were...


Concerned enough to highlight flaws in the report, with one Professor of Government calling it a 'shoddy exercise', full of 'spurious generalisations and dubious conclusions' that amounted to an 'almost worthless piece of research'.

It was established, following Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, that no ethical approval procedure had preceded Casey's interviews with the families. In 2013, Casey effectively invented a survey and a statistic that she claimed, 'encapsulates the problem of 'troubled families' in one story' and which demonstrated the need for 'radical reform' of local services. When the independent evaluation of the first phase of the Troubled Families Programme found no discernible impact of the programme, Casey called the judgement and integrity of some of the researchers involved into question.

Casey has been involved in carrying out other pieces of research related work and her inspection of Rotherham Council following the Child Sexual Exploitation that took place there was largely welcomed. The final report however, has been criticised because of a lack of clarity about how information was collected and analysed and the lack of an obvious methodology. Despite claiming in the report that culture is 'hard to inspect' (p28), she proceeds to highlight 'an archaic culture of sexism, bullying and discomfort around race' (p9), a 'culture of covering up uncomfortable truths' (p10), a 'culture of shouting and abuse' (p30) and numerous other 'cultures' that she uncovered and inspected during her time in Rotherham.

Similar inconsistencies, omissions and generalisations can be found in her review into opportunity and integration. Despite being told that 800 people were spoken to and over 200 written submissions were received, we are not informed how all this data was collected, stored and analysed. There is no indication that there was a systematic approach to evidence collection, and no hint of any methodological approach. Chapter 2 is titled 'Why conduct an integration review?' and, over the next two-and-a-half pages, we are told why, but we are not informed as to how, the review was conducted. In addition to the lack of a methodology, there is also no information on ethical considerations, the resources that were involved (including members of the review team), the sampling method(s) used when collecting data, how existing literature was reviewed, if at all, or if any theoretical framework informed the analysis. An example of this unsatisfactory approach can be found in Annex B – a 'rapid review of integration in a selection of European nations'. There is no indication that the review, even though it was rapid, was carried out systematically and there is no information as to why, for example, the six countries concerned were chosen, what selection criteria (if any) were used, and why others were omitted from the review.

Casey states that 'no review starts from a blank piece of paper', that she is 'grateful to all whose research and opinion I could call upon to help guide the work' and that her review 'takes and builds on all that expertise' (p5). Again, however, we do not know what was already on the piece of paper.

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what the terms of reference for the review were (they were never published separately), what was 'off-limits', or indeed whose expertise she drew on. We are informed that Casey 'wrestled with what to put in and what to leave out' (p5), but we are not told how she made these difficult decisions. Annex A which examines and summarises past UK community cohesion reports and programmes provides no mention of the substantial academic critiques of these programmes, suggesting that the review was not built on this body of knowledge.

Casey reports that 'I went where the evidence took me' (p5) despite also acknowledging that 'in many cases … the available data are already feeling out of date' (p7). No new or specific research was commissioned for her review. There are over 350 end-notes in the review, which, at first glance, appears impressive and comprehensive. However, upon closer inspection, many of them are repeat entries and most are political speeches, media reports and statistics or research produced by government departments, commissions or quasi non-governmental organisations. Given Casey's previous involvement in the misrepresentation of government statistics, we should also be concerned about the conclusions she has drawn from the documents listed.\(^3\)

Very little 'independent' academic research can be found in the end-notes, leaving open the possibility that the review was conducted in an echo chamber, with little attention paid to competing or contrasting views. Casey going where the evidence took her is the data collecting equivalent of simply 'riding to the sounds of the guns'. It is an approach that has been largely discredited since the 1950s when Edwin Lemert and other sociologists encouraged researchers to look in different directions and to not just follow the path of least resistance in conducting their research. These aspects of the Casey Review suggest that Casey adopted a largely unquestioning 'common-sense' approach to what she saw and what she was told, and continued to view critical academic research as a hindrance, rather than a help. In keeping with this approach, less tangible structural and political determinants of opportunity and integration remain relatively undiscussed in her review.

These concerns are not, however, examples of academic snobbery or pedantry. Nor are they 'ivory tower' anxieties about the quality of the 'debate', or the 'impact' of academic research in our society. They are legitimate concerns about how policies, which affect the lives of millions of people, many of them disadvantaged and marginalised, are formulated. When the government publishes proposals to improve the cohesion of our society, we should feel confident that such proposals are built upon the best possible available evidence. We should feel confident that large amounts of data, on a sensitive and important topic, and which undoubtedly contain differing and diverging perspectives, have been collected ethically, and analysed methodically, such that the information is not subject to (un)conscious bias. We should feel reassured that the terms of reference for the review were appropriate and that the resources available to carry out the review were sufficient for the task in hand. Perhaps most importantly, we should feel confident that the individual leading the review has a robust track record for integrity and honesty, and the ability to carry out such an important task. Unfortunately, the appointment of the putatively 'straight-talking' Casey to lead the review, and the report she produced provides none of these reassurances, and feels more like a government commissioned confidence trick.

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A LONG HISTORY OF WELCOMING?

Lucy Mayblin

The British government, whatever its current political stripes, loves to boast about Britain’s long, and proud, tradition of welcoming migrants and refugees. The recent Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper is no exception. It begins with ‘our vision’: ‘Britain is an open and tolerant country which has a long history of welcoming migrants and the benefits they bring, as well as meeting our international obligations to refugees’.

This ‘long and proud’ phrase is so ubiquitous that it is almost a cliché. In my own recent research which has involved interviewing people involved with asylum policymaking in the UK (policy officials in the Home Office, former Home Secretaries, special advisors to these Home Secretaries, amongst others), one former special advisor even commented, “one of those phrases we always put in to every speech is the one about having a long and proud tradition of protecting refugees. So then when you announce the policy everyone is happy; we’re protecting the system from abuse and protecting those in need. That way there’s something for everybody.”

So how about this ‘long and proud’ tradition? Is it something that we can trace across time? Unfortunately, anyone who has studied the history of immigration to Britain will know that it is much easier to find examples of the state passing new legislation to keep (particularly black and brown) migrants out of the country, of steadily reducing immigrants’ social and economic rights, of creating a ‘hostile environment’, building walls and special detention centres and, and even of turning brown citizens into immigrants for the purpose of excluding them. Add this to a broader context of hostility to immigrants - one in which today’s Brexit Britain is generally seen as much more tolerant and welcoming than the imagined monocultural Britain of the past - and the ‘long and proud tradition’ starts to look a bit empty. Unfortunately, when we look at the history of asylum and immigration policy in the UK we find a long and shameful history of exclusion, othering, dehumanization, criminalization, impoverishment, and the shirking of international responsibilities.

I will explain with reference to some of my own research on the history of asylum policy in Britain. In 1951 Britain signed the Convention on the Status of Refugees at the UN. The human rights framework was based on the idea that the need for some legal constraints on a state’s sovereignty might be necessary in order to prevent a repeat of the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany. Before this people didn’t really have any rights aside from their rights as citizens of a particular country, and so had no right to be protected if the rulers of their country persecuted them. As Hannah Arendt famously put it in The Origins of Totalitarianism, when forced to flee their country and effectively made stateless, Jewish refugees found that they had lost the right even to have rights.

And this was in part because the Jews had been failed. Britain, for example, did not offer them protection from persecution in a manner which might be described as part of a ‘proud’ tradition of

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welcoming refugees. Britain resisted taking refugees from Germany and Eastern Europe in the late 1930s, explicitly stating a preference for Aryan refugees. The Home Secretary told parliament in 1938 that the mass migration of Jews must, rather perversely, be prevented in order to prevent the growth of anti-Semitism in Britain. While Britain took thousands of Jews before the end of the war, this was not good hearted. For example, the parents of children arriving via the Kindertransport were not permitted to accompany them, and many of the older kindertransportees were classified as potential enemy aliens and either interned or closely surveilled. The main concern in Britain, as in other European countries, was with not being unduly burdened with dependent migrants.

The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was supposed to rectify such inhumane responses which lead to the deaths of millions. So now refugees have the right to cross an international border without the proper documents, have the right to apply for asylum and for their application to be properly assessed, and the right not to be sent back to their home country, or a third country, where their lives might be endangered.

Britain, then the British Empire, was a founding signatory, and while today our historical role in the convention drafting is apparently a source of national pride and evidence of our long and proud tradition of protecting refugees, my own research on the convention negotiations tells a less flattering story. In the late 1940s British government ministers were in fact strongly against human rights, particularly if they affected activities in the Empire. The cabinet secretary’s notebooks from the period show that there were long discussions between senior British ministers about not wanting to be bound by the human rights conventions, but equally not wanting to be seen to be against them.

The reluctance stemmed from the fact that the so called ‘coloured populations’ were treated as inferior humans by Britain and the US, despite the British Empire’s rhetoric of fairness and equality. Over time, due to domestic and external pressure, not least the need to be seen to take the moral high ground internationally, there was little choice but to sign up to the human rights agenda as it unfolded. The central concern was ensuring the least inhibiting outcome regarding activities in the Empire. So a clause, was proposed and passed in the negotiations which allowed colonial powers to decide which of its territories human rights would apply to. Despite at this time holding significant overseas territories, the UK extended the Convention only to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.

What this example shows is the longevity of exclusionary asylum practices. The British government was hostile to granting non-European asylum seekers refugee rights under international law from the start of the refugee regime. It was only in 1967, under increasing pressure from decolonizing countries, particularly those in Africa who, unprotected within the UN, were developing their own human rights framework which threatened to undermine the international dominance of the United Nations, that the refugee convention was extended to include those displaced outside of Europe.

So what about now? Perhaps the tradition is, if not long, then more recently ‘proud’? Unfortunately not. In recent years the rights of asylum seekers have been steadily eroded. Though the British government was reluctant to sign up to the refugee convention, it remained tolerable initially as it allowed a trickle of Cold War refugees to flee West. Though conflicts, and indeed refugees, existed outside of Europe, most people did not have the means to flee to the continent. Most still don’t.

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87% of the world’s refugees still reside in a neighbouring country to that which they have fled, and Britain does not neighbour a refugee producing country. But in the late 1990s more of these non-European asylum seekers managed to make their way to Europe than had previously, and sometimes they reached Britain.

The arrival of non-European migrants in any number has always been received as a crisis, and this was the case in the early 2000s. If there were more asylum seekers from outside of Europe, this was interpreted as a wave of economic migration disguised as asylum seeking—so many people from poor countries could, of course, not be legitimate asylum seekers. The result of the ensuing moral panic in Britain was nine rafts of primary legislation in under two decades, which steadily eroded the rights of asylum seekers.

Measures such as detention, dispersal, reporting, fingerprinting, impoverishment, and social and economic exclusion, have since proliferated and are a normal part of the asylum regime. Indeed, every effort has been made to limit the number of people who are legally recognised as having been persecuted, irrespective of the country contexts from which they flee. Asylum applicants are largely banned from working. They currently receive £36.95 per week in welfare. This represents less than a third of the income of the poorest 10% of the UK population and was set specifically in relation to what that group spends on essential living needs. The only place where asylum seekers can work is in immigration detention centres, where many are incarcerated sporadically, here they are paid between £1 and £1.25 per hour to undertake jobs which are integral to the running of the centres that incarcerate them. This example itself revealing the disjuncture between ‘hostile environment’ policies for immigrants, and those which seek to eliminate forced labour.

In 2012 a national charity The Children’s Society, instigated a parliamentary inquiry in to asylum support for children and young people. It concluded that ‘the current levels of support provided to families are too low to meet children’s essential living needs’. Low levels of asylum support were, expert witnesses including academic researchers, social workers, local authorities and health professionals, suggested, producing malnutrition, high infant and maternal mortality rates, disrupted education for children, mental health problems, health problems related to living in dirty damp conditions and having inadequate clothing, risk of exploitation, and domestic violence. In short, the impacts identified were all symptoms of living in poverty with factors such as forced dispersal and histories of persecution compounding the impacts of that poverty.

In July 2013 the charity Freedom from Torture, which supports torture survivors, published a research report on poverty amongst asylum seekers and refugees. In his foreword Juan Méndez, United Nations Special Reporter on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, wrote: “The research [documented in this report] demonstrates that torture survivors living in exile in the UK are pushed into poverty by government systems that are meant to support them as they pass through the asylum determination system and beyond. I know through the work of

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39 OECD (2017). Perspectives on Global Development 2017 International Migration in a Shifting World, available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cxG0DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA34&lpg=PA34&dq=87%25+of+the+world%e2%80%99s+refugees+still+reside+in+a+neighbouring+country+to+that+which+they+have+fled&source=b&ots=asQzy5DKn&sig=5QddR0O8rz_RmJeeQPzI7qUmpC0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiW0pKVtVdaAhVljcAKH4bB-OQ6AlfJAgj#v=onepage&q=87%25%20of%20the%20world%e2%80%99s%20refugees%20still%20reside%20in%20a%20neighbouring%20country%20to%20that%20which%20they%20have%20fled&f=false.


my mandate internationally that many torture survivors who manage to reach and claim protection in States such as the UK may not have directly experienced these levels of absolute or relative poverty before."

One single justification has been given for these policies of impoverishment: that welfare and work act as pull factors for disingenuous asylum seekers coming to the UK. Yet, there have been 23 peer reviewed studies on pull factors since 2002 but not one has found a long term correlation between welfare and work rules, and numbers of asylum seekers. In my own interviews with policy makers none were able to present any evidence for work or welfare acting as pull factors. That the policy of impoverishment is, in short, not based on any evidence, but is rather driven by the imperative to be systematically unwelcoming to asylum seekers.

It is within this policy context that we come to the British response to the crisis of refugee reception facing the wider European continent since 2015. Prime Minister Cameron and then Home Secretary Theresa May explained that sharing the burden with their European counterparts would act as a pull factor. The Conservative government therefore opted out of an EU plan to offer resettlement to a limited number of refugees in response to the crisis in the Mediterranean, and have accepted only small numbers taken from camps in the Middle East as part of the UN resettlement programme. Here, again, while doing little we can argue that we have high moral standards. As the special advisor quoted at the beginning explained: we’re protecting the system from abuse and protecting those in need. That way there’s something for everybody.

The claim that Britain has a long and proud tradition of protecting refugees from persecution is, in conclusion, mere rhetoric. There have been moments of hospitality, but scratch the surface and they have often been late in any given crisis and always reluctantly conceded to. Britain was a reluctant signatory of the 1951 refugee convention, and the exclusionary impulse continues today. In fact, we might conclude from this brief overview that Britain has a long history of seeking to avoid being seen as too generous, too welcoming, lest people seek asylum here.

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THE GOVERNMENT’S HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON INTEGRATION

Jenny Phillimore and Nando Sigona

Can you have an integrated society in a hostile environment? The UK Government’s strategy doesn’t aim to promote a better integrated society for all, but more ‘integrated communities’, placing the onus of integration firmly on migrants and ethnic minorities.

The Department of Housing, Communities and Local Government’s (DHCLG) much awaited Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper was released on March 14. The Green Paper places much emphasis on the importance of social integration which is referred to as ‘meaningfully mixing’ with people from different backgrounds. Although the remit for the Green Paper was wide and intended to address the whole population, from the title it is clear that the emphasis is on the new migrant and minority communities and the alleged integration gap affecting them.

The paper is the official response to the ‘challenge’ posed in Dame Louise Casey’s Independent Review of 2016 whose focus, in turn, was on ‘our most isolated and deprived communities’ which were portrayed as isolated, both socially and spatially, from mainstream society.43

A prominent quote by Dame Casey set the tone for the Green paper: ‘for generations we have welcomed immigrants to the UK but left them to find their own way’, we could be forgiven for thinking that the way that immigrants have chosen led them away from mixing.

Similarly to the Casey Review, in the Green paper, isolation, deprivation, lack of participation are invariably constructed as having little to do with the conditions of their lives in Britain and factors such as structural discrimination and wealth inequality. Instead, the causes of the integration deficit and the onus of integrating are placed on ‘them’, migrants and ethnic minorities.

Much emphasis is placed on finding ways to encourage immigrants to move away from segregated communities and for schools to become more mixed. No consideration is given of the extensive evidence offered that they have not chosen to self-segregate44. Indeed, research evidence shows quite clearly that the white middle classes are the most segregated of all ethnic groups and that areas seen as self-segregated were more fluid than predominantly white areas. In fact, minority residents moved away from these areas if they were able to be upwardly mobile, a phenomenon observed throughout large cities such as Birmingham where minorities and migrants are now found in every ward of the city.45 Work undertaken in places such as Handsworth, Birmingham, has shown that rather than being segregated, inner city areas are becoming increasingly diverse as people are

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attracted to neighbourhoods by their population diversity and identify with their neighbours on the grounds that ‘we are all different here’ or they are all working class. Hardly self-segregation.

Further work we have undertaken with refugees has shown that the anti-migrant rhetoric evident in newspapers and from certain politicians made them fearful of attempting to mix. Those who had experienced racial harassment actively avoided contact with anyone, which left them vulnerable to isolation and depression. With racist harassment on the rise post-Brexit referendum, the UK Government’s ongoing efforts at creating a hostile environment for migrants and rising anti-migration discourses, it is, perhaps, a wonder that migrants seek to mix at all.

It is important to note that people do mix in their everyday lives in shops, work, neighbourhoods and shared spaces. The growing body of work on everyday multiculturalism and commonplace diversity is testament to this. On the whole people get along. Why do we need meaningful mixing? Not sure we have an answer to this but we do know that continued interaction makes a difference in terms of feelings of trust and belonging and that knowing that ‘other’ people are open to building positive relationships is a good starting point. If the Government are to succeed in socially integrating communities they have much to address. This would include adopting a more responsible and balanced discourse around migration, and acting against the inflammatory anti-migration, anti-Muslim, anti-refugee rhetoric in popular newspapers; and pro-actively encouraging ‘white’ British people to be open to ‘mixing’.

If the Government is serious about trying to engineer interaction it first needs to properly understand who is segregated, identify exactly why this is a problem, take account of extensive evidence about the impact of the current anti-migration discourse, and of racist harassment, on people’s willingness to mix and then needs to invest in places and initiatives to encourage interactions in the long-term. The Green paper does not take account of the Government’s own responsibility for creating conditions where people can mix and appears once again to lay responsibility for mixing at the door of those who have been vilified thereby scapegoating migrants and risking further exacerbation of anti-migrant sentiment. Moreover, while the Green Paper argues that integration is the responsibility of local communities it avoids accepting national responsibility for the current discourse and for the decline in community facilities leaving impoverished local authorities and communities to do all of the work with no resources.

Criminalising first, integrating second

While there is evidence of growing hostility towards immigrants and especially asylum seekers under Labour, the criminalisation of foreign-born residents become state policy when Theresa May championed the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ for ‘illegal’ migrants in Britain as a key policy goal. Under the rubric of the ‘hostile environment’ falls a set of wide-ranging policy initiatives, executive interventions and political messaging that have reshaped not only the immigration and

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49 The ‘blunt-speaking’ of then Home Secretary David Blunkett on asylum and migration caused numerous controversies. See: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/apr/26/immigrationandpublicservices.
asylum regimes for new comers but also redrawn the rules affecting those already in the country\textsuperscript{50}. Far from a targeted intervention aimed to reduce undocumented migration, hostile environment initiatives have been affecting regular and irregular migrants alike and often also BME citizens. Foreign born residents and visible minorities have been increasingly asked to prove their right to stay in Britain in the context of a continuous shifting of goal posts for lawful migration. If you are not white and British you must now prove that you have a right to be here. The same rules do not seem to apply to the white British who emigrated to Britain having been born in the former colonies.

The Windrush generation scandal demonstrates the lengths to which the British Government is willing to go in pursuit of its agenda. What the ‘hostile environment’ does is to make everyone born overseas feel precarious, including individuals and families who have resided in Britain for decades. And it is not surprising that the treatment of the Commonwealth subjects is cause of great concern among the EU nationals in the UK, they too came as EU citizens to Britain in the exercise of freedom of movement and are now asked to produce proof of their right to stay in the emerging post-Brexit scenario\textsuperscript{51}. Research shows that EU citizens and their family members living in the UK under EU law are at risk of ‘falling through the cracks’ of the UK-EU negotiations, with their rights of future residence and citizenship in question after Brexit.

The current Government’s approach to immigration control constructs all migrants, including EU citizens, as potentially ‘illegal’. To all these people, it is obvious that the proposals included in the DHCLG Integrated Communities Strategy herald another round of the British government asking yet more from them, yet another test to prove their commitment to Britain, rather than a genuine concern for making their lives in Britain better and ensuring they have the same life chances as the rest of the population, those who do not have to prove when seeking work, housing, health or bank accounts, that they their presence in Britain is legitimate.


The Integrated Communities Green Paper identifies a number of barriers believed to be preventing integration in Britain. These include alleged residential segregation, school segregation, religious and cultural norms inhibiting public engagement (mainly for women), labour market disadvantage, and lack of social mixing. While the evidence for some of the bolder claims is mixed and certainly more contested than the paper allows, one of the prevailing means of overcoming these barriers is deemed to include interventions in the education system. For example, the Green Paper’s proposals include a desire to “work with Ofsted to ensure that there is strong coverage of schools’ promotion of Fundamental British Values (FBV) and integration within its new inspection arrangements” (page 14).

In this way the Green Paper bundles together what are involuntary structural inequalities with attitudinal issues, but does so in a manner that signals a continuation of recent ‘values based’ integration approaches.

Why is this a problem? The Green Paper adopts the idea of FBV not from recent consultation, but from broader political discourse going back to 2011 and specifically the definition of ‘extremism’ that was outlined in the Government’s counter-terrorism Prevent strategy as follows: “Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas” (page 107).\textsuperscript{52}

This is neither new thinking nor consistent with the prevailing characterisation of a British national identity that has evolved, and continues to evolve, by being remade over time, and not least by black and ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{53} The definition of FBV instead is that used in the 2011 Department for Education (DfE) which identified that upholding ‘Teacher’s Standards’ included “not undermining the fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty”.\textsuperscript{54} A few years later the then education secretary Michael Gove announced that all schools would be required to promote FBV (Wintour, 2014), with the publication of statutory guidance through ‘Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural’ development (SMSC) in schools.\textsuperscript{55} Linked to this was the expansion of


Prevent duty guidance, which explicitly used FBV within the definition of extremism, in ways that are also present in the Green Paper where it insists that extremism can be anticipated where there are 'negative cultural norms' (page 12). As a consequence, the Green Paper endorses and promotes the idea that some minority communities are a security risk not because they incite or engage in violence or activities that might do so, but because they bear values that do not conform to those insisted upon by the government of the day.

There is a clear schism then between the nature of the consultation and community engagement that the government wishes to undertake as part of its broader integration strategy, and the implicit assumptions of that strategy itself. This is borne out in first-hand experience. In April 2018 one of the authors attended a ‘community’ event held in one of the five integration areas earmarked in the Green Paper to receive initial funding and support. The event was organised by a local activist who opened by stating that following recent hostilities in the area - brought on by an EDL march and the ‘punish a Muslim day’ letter - locals increasingly felt they were being left out of the national conversation. Following this short opening address, the floor was given over to a number of senior local politicians who delivered speeches about the value of diversity and the importance of recognising we all come from different places and times. None of the speakers seemed comfortable offering reflections for a shared future; instead most retreated to policy speak about desiring and designing community cohesion. There appeared to be a sense of perplexity among those present, reflected in the sudden discussion of strained race relations (if we can call it that).

It was only when the Mayor gave his address that there seemed to be something that might resemble collective sentiment in the audience. The Mayor recounted an event he had attended at the local Methodist Church about which he remarked: “the minister gave a speech that could've easily been a civic address”. This point seemed to have an effect that no other had so far, with the Mayor offering some authority and anchoring to a discussion that was becoming increasingly vexed. At a time when people expressed concern toward new problems (anti-Muslim hate, white disenchantment) and worried that there were only old solutions (community cohesion); the Mayor appeared to offer some direction. What seemed to come across in the space that this community event had become was that the church might offer an organising site for British values.

The above scenario prompts the need for a broader discussion about faith-based identities in public life, and yet the Green Paper signals a continuation of policy over the past decade or so where governments have made overtures to multi-faith based identities in public life, but resorted to a type of majoritarianism in policy. For since 2010, we have witnessed a move in public policy toward foregrounding the nation’s Christian heritage. Near Neighbours, for example, which was the government’s most recent intervention in this area was administered by the Church of England and activated the parish structures in its administration. Requiring applicants to have knowledge about this traditional system, it worked to reinforce ecclesiastical authority of Christian religion in the administration of public affairs.

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58 See the website at: https://www.cuf.org.uk/near-neighbours.
FBV in this respect marks an easy retreat into a master signifier – that of Christianity – which operates not only as a default identity position for the nation, but in a way that becomes set against minorities. The current Head of Ofsted, Amanda Spielman, for example, recently chose to give a speech at the Church of England Foundation for Education Leadership, where she said, “One of those values as articulated in the definition of British values is ‘mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith’. It is a happy fact that almost every Church of England school we visit takes that value seriously… But tolerance and respect does not mean that we should privilege all belief above criticism. Ofsted inspectors are increasingly brought into contact with those who want to actively pervert the purpose of education. Under the pretext of religious belief, they use education institutions, legal and illegal, to narrow young people’s horizons, to isolate and segregate, and in the worst cases to indoctrinate impressionable minds with extremist ideology.”

This slippage is evident in the numerous references in the Green paper to perceived problems that have arisen as the UK has become more diverse over the past half-century and more. For example, the structures of leadership and representation within minority ethnic and religiously defined communities that are believed to lead to separatism and segregation (page 17); or the lament at the loss of the ‘local’ as areas are felt to become unrecognizable following the arrival of newcomers (pages 20–25); and the perceived tendency among minority communities to hold on to customs and norms from overseas and should swap these for FBV (pages 43–49). Indeed, each chapter of the report features in its rationale some references to the alleged threat posed to FBV from new dynamics in the economy, society and within communities.

FBV in this context represents a set of codes whose primary function is to reaffirm qualities of Britishness and national identity in a way that has specific implications for British Muslims. There is undoubtedly an implicit narrative around the threat of ‘Islamic radicalism’ that connects FBV, SMSC, Prevent and this Green Paper. These efforts to reify Britishness have heralded a dynamic in which the reification of Britishness occurs where the interests of British Muslims as stakeholders in both nation and national security are diminished. The community event cited above is an example of the fatigue that may be setting in among British Muslims in relation to assertions of belonging in the UK. As repeated surveys have shown, Muslims express attachment to Britain at higher levels than other minority groups. The danger here is that the outcomes of these strategies could sustain a focus on issues around the fringes of radicalisation, rather than allowing a meaningful exploration for how the dynamics of these related strategies might contribute to the alienation of presently ‘integrated’ Muslim communities.

A recent research project conducted by researchers at University of Manchester offers some worrying insights into the effects of such stigmatisation on cohorts of young people, who narrate experiences of mistrust and suspicion directed toward them. At the same time they also embody a certain promise in connecting across differences though volunteering and activism. The social and civic engagement among ‘integrated’ Muslim communities – in for example the response to the tragedy of Grenfell Tower and aftermath of the Manchester Arena bombing - did not require the organising authority of the church or the state or commandments to FBV. Taking such things into account is more than a missed opportunity, it is a design of an approach in which ideological

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61 PROMISE: Promoting Youth Involvement and Engagement. Available at: http://www.promise.manchester.ac.uk/en/home-page/
commitments to FBV are elevated above formal data and the kinds of findings that might emerge from a sincere and purposeful consultation.
COUNTERING EXTREMISM THROUGH INTEGRATION?

Therese O’Toole

Addressing ‘a vacuum on integration policy’, the government’s Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper constitutes the first significant attempt by government to articulate a national strategy for integration in over a decade. The Green Paper identifies extremism as an obstacle to the achievement of integration and enfoils the goals of Counter Extremism into the concerns of integration. The evolving Counter Terrorism and Counter Extremism agendas have long been concerned with the problem of integration, but what role should either of those agendas play in the formulation of integration policy?

The government’s 2015 Counter Extremism Strategy set out four strands to dealing with the ideologies and attitudes that foster terrorism and ‘murderous hate crimes’: 1) countering extremist ideology; 2) building partnerships with those opposed to extremism; 3) disrupting extremists; and 4) building cohesive communities. In relation to the latter, the Counter Extremism Strategy expressed concern that lack of integration creates divided and ‘isolated communities’ who ‘will be less resilient to the threat posed by extremism’ (page 37). It suggested work on the 4th strand would be the subject of the 2016 Casey Review on integration, and that review has informed the present Green Paper. Like the 2015 Counter Extremism Strategy and Casey Review, the Green Paper cites lack of integration as a key risk factor in the spread of extremism, suggesting segregated and ‘isolated’ communities ‘may lead to higher levels of mistrust between people of different backgrounds’ (page 12), and warning a ‘lack of meaningful social mixing’ can lead to a scenario where ‘Negative cultural norms can take hold, including prejudice, anti-social behaviour and oppression of women, [which] can be exploited by extremists.’ (page 12).

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Nonetheless, the Green Paper expresses a celebratory view of Britain’s ethnic and cultural diversity, declaring it has become ‘one of the most successful multi-faith, and multi-ethnic, societies in the world’ (page 10). The Green Paper notes several challenges to this proud track record, however, such as the persistence of inequalities – as detailed in the government’s Race Disparity Audit.\(^\text{65}\) It cites the launch of the Commission for Countering Extremism as one of the measures that government has introduced ‘to tackle the most persistent and gravest inequalities’ (page 13).\(^\text{66}\) Not only is Counter Extremism posited in the Green Paper as a strategy for tackling inequalities, it is also presented as key to the promotion of rights and freedoms that are foundational to the government’s integration strategy (it is worth noting that the section on extremism appears in ‘Chapter 7: Rights and Freedoms’ of the Green Paper).

For those who worry that the Counter Extremism agenda is harmful to the integration and equality of (especially Muslim) minorities, or to civil liberties, the Green Paper asserts it instead as integral to their achievement. This entails re-framing Counter Extremism as a means of: guaranteeing those rights and freedoms that are threatened by extremists; addressing inequalities experienced by women in minority communities at the hands of conservative men or harmful cultural practices; and promoting shared ‘fundamental British values’ that are essential to cohesive communities. This re-framing is moreover dependent upon the disassociation of Counter Extremism from Prevent (the counter-radicalisation strand of the government’s counter-terrorism – CONTEST – agenda). There are, however, several tensions involved in moves to re-frame Counter Extremism in these ways.

**Prevent and Counter Extremism**

It is perhaps unsurprising that the government seeks to distance Counter Extremism from Prevent. Controversial from the start, Prevent continues to attract criticisms from various quarters, notwithstanding the reforms it has undergone since 2010.\(^\text{67}\) In 2017, the former independent reviewer of the government’s counter-terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, argued that ‘Prevent is controversial, to the point where reputable community organisations refuse to engage with it’ and that it needs significant reform.\(^\text{68}\) A former senior metropolitan police officer, Dal Babu, has described Prevent as a ‘toxic’ brand, that is widely mistrusted.\(^\text{69}\)

Government seeks to differentiate Counter Extremism from Prevent by claiming the former aims ‘to counter the wider social harms caused by extremism’, whilst Prevent aims to ‘stop individuals becoming radicalised or supporting terrorism’. Despite such assertions, much of what is set out in the Counter Extremism agenda is contained in the 2011 Prevent strategy,\(^\text{70}\) including the aims to tackle

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66 For the Government’s statement about the Commission, see: [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/commission-for-countering-extremism](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/commission-for-countering-extremism).


68 David Anderson, QC, Evening Standard, February 15th 2017, ‘Prevent strategy can work against radicalisation... if it is trusted’. Available at: [https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/david-anderson-qc-prevent-strategy-can-work-against-radicalisation-if-it-is-trusted-a3467901.html](https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/david-anderson-qc-prevent-strategy-can-work-against-radicalisation-if-it-is-trusted-a3467901.html).


extremism (‘preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas’) and pursue integration as a means of tackling radicalisation:

“There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.” (page 5)

The 2011 Prevent strategy asserted, though, that – learning from past mistakes – ‘Government will not securitise its integration strategy’, whilst ‘Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of Prevent and will be coordinated from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)’ (page 6). In fact, the Home Office does manage both Counter Extremism and Prevent (and in a much more centralised way since 2011), with Counter Extremism and Prevent personnel and programmes, locally and nationally, coordinated by the Home Office.71 It is difficult to see, then, how either conceptually, strategically or operationally these agendas do not overlap.

**Protecting rights and freedoms**

A difficulty for Prevent and Counter Extremism have been charges they undermine civil liberties and human rights. By contrast, the Green Paper seeks to re-frame Counter Extremism as part of the government’s strategy to protect rights and freedoms – specifically the rights of women and LGBT groups that are jeopardised by extremists:

“The harm caused by extremists – justifying violence, promoting hatred and division, encouraging isolation and separation, denying rights to women and girls and LGBT people – presents a threat to our society and must be addressed.” (page 57)

This construction has been deployed before – notably in the justification of the attacks on Afghanistan or more generalised ‘war on terror’72 This construction ignores, however, the impact of the Counter Extremism agenda itself on rights and freedoms – not least due to the more conceptually expansive nature of Prevent and its concern since 2011 with tackling non-violent extremism, alongside its operational expansion since 2015 as a statutory duty across public sector institutions including schools, universities, the health sector, charities and prisons and probation services.73 This has raised concerns about the discriminatory effects of monitoring for very broadly defined signs of radicalisations on Muslim pupils, students, patients and public-sector workers, and the implications for freedom of expression and right to democratic dissent.

Government has nonetheless indicated that it will further legislate against extremism. One challenge, however, has been the difficulties in arriving at a legally defensible definition. In 2016

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the House of Commons Joint Select Committee on Human Rights concluded the government’s definitions of extremism are couched in such general terms that they would be likely to prove unworkable as a legislative definition and argued attempts to do so would interfere with freedoms of religion and expression, have a disproportionate impact on religiously conservative communities and involve public sector institutions in managing conflicting obligations to uphold rights and freedoms. Consequently, it recommended: ‘The Government should not legislate, least of all in areas which impinge on human rights, unless there is a clear gap in the existing legal framework’ (pages 3–5).

Shared/Fundamental British Values

The Green Paper warns that ‘Extremists promote actions that undermine our shared values’ (page 57), and states that promoting ‘shared values and community cohesion’ will be the role of the Countering Extremism Commission (page 59), and achieved through teaching ‘fundamental British values’ in schools (page 14) – the definition of which is contained in the 2011 Prevent strategy (page 107), then incorporated by the DfE into teaching standards in 2012, and made a statutory requirement on teachers with the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act.

The advancing ‘fundamental British values’ agenda – from its origins in Prevent to becoming a requirement in education and potentially a key aspect of integration policy – has taken place in the absence of any real debate on what shared or ‘fundamental British values’ are, or ought to be, or why they should be folded into the Countering Extremism agenda. A report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement cautions against linking these agendas:

The promotion of Shared British Values should be separated from counter-extremism policy. [...] the primary objective of promoting Shared Values of British Citizenship is to encourage positive citizenship rather than solely aiming to counter extremism. (paragraph 70).

Civic engagement and integration

The Green Paper concludes by inviting responses from individuals and organisations to its proposals, although to questions that reinforce its re-framing of extremism as integral to rights, freedoms and integration – asking whether we agree with measures to ‘encourage integration and resist divisive views or actions’ or ‘address practices which can impact on the rights of women’? (page 62) The questions we might ask are whether extremism or shared values or integration should be conceptualised in the way they have been in the Green Paper?

75 Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted.
Britain is a highly segregated society. It boasts the widest Gini coefficient of all the OECD countries in Europe when income inequality is considered.\footnote{The Gini Coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income or wealth distribution of a nation’s residents, and is the most commonly used measurement of inequality.} It is home to the most socially segregated system of education in Europe. No other European country has such a high proportion of children being privately educated in a way in which the spending on their education is so much higher than that spent on the other 93% of children, without palpable national benefit.

At the other end of life, Britain, in our old age, boasts both some of the widest health inequalities in Europe and also some of the lowest expectations of length of life. We live in a highly divided society and this should be an issue of great concern, not least because it makes us more stupid and less healthy in aggregate, detrimentally affecting even those at the very top.

Perhaps to help illustrate the detrimental effects of living with great segregation the Prime Minister, Theresa May, makes a series of simple geographical mistakes in her foreword to the Green Paper. In her first paragraph she refers to the four countries of the United Kingdom as one country – failing to acknowledge the devolved administrations and differing approaches of other people from other parts of the Kingdom.

Mrs May is part of a very small segment of society, especially isolated from others in British society, and her words reflect this. In the same short paragraph she condescendingly, and with a flourish of megalomania, promises that she herself will ‘build a country that works for everyone ... in which everyone, whatever their background, can go as far as their hard work will take them’. In future, phrases such as this will be looked back at as being very telling of her and her governments’ thinking and beliefs. She follows a politics that is itself a product of great social segregation. Few other European countries have a major political party as far to the right as the Conservatives are. In the European Parliament the Conservatives were forced to align themselves with groups such as the Polish ‘Law and Justice’ party; because they had so little in common with other European Conservatives.

Contemporary British Conservative politicians often grow up on the fiction that when people ‘get ahead’ it is because their ‘hard work’ got them there. However, if these politicians, when young, had worked harder and overcome their prejudices they may not have made so many simple mistakes later in life. But it is very difficult to learn to treat people well when you do not grow up with them. In 2013 even Nigel Farage criticized Theresa May’s ‘go home’ vans of operation ‘Vaken’.\footnote{Travis, A. (2013) ‘Go home’ vans resulted in 11 people leaving Britain, says report, The Guardian, October 31st, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/31/go-home-vans-11-leave-britain} When, in her second paragraph, Theresa May suggested that ‘Britain is one of the world’s most successful multi-ethnic, multi-faith societies’, the actions of her own Home Office prove that not to have been the case.

In her third paragraph (on page 7 of the Green Paper) the Prime Minster claimed that her government’s recent Race Disparity Audit had been ‘ground-breaking’. It was not. Geographers have...
explained that it 'meant little' because it showed so little understanding of geography. Mrs May said it would help address the inequalities that 'prevent us from building a Britain where everyone has the chance to succeed.' Note again, the implication being that individuals should be given 'chances'. The language will be familiar to children who have read the 'Hunger Games' books, where all children are given 'a chance'.

In her fourth paragraph of introduction the Prime Minister said that the reason to confront segregation is because it 'undermines our unity as a nation'. She is obsessed with the idea of Britain as a nation, a single country, her country. She and her government also have a tendency to talk of everyone as being like them and so use the word, 'our'. Recently Jan-Werner Müller identified such language as being typical of populist politicians who try to claim that they are representative of everyone, of the 100%, as Mr Trump and Mrs May do.80

In her fifth paragraph the Prime Minister claimed that the Green Paper will 'tackle the root causes of a lack of integration – including a lack of social mixing in some of our neighbourhoods and schools, unemployment and poor English language skills.' These are part of the reason some people are less integrated into society than others, but not in the way Mrs May means. For instance, while she was growing up she did not go to the same schools as most other children in Oxfordshire, and many (if not most) of the young adults she met at university went to segregated private schools. But she will not see her isolation, and the isolation of people like her, as being one of the worst forms of a lack of social mixing in Britain, as compared to other countries in the world where such social isolation is far less common.81 This is basic geographical knowledge. But she does not have that knowledge.

It is not Mrs May’s fault that she does not understand Britain. She was almost certainly never taught human geography well at her school or university and her advisors now are misinforming her still. She did not benefit from going to school where the most common language after English was Urdu. She did not go to a school with a wide cross section of society. She did not grow up in a diverse neighbourhood. She did not make friends later from a wide cross section. Why should we expect her to have integrated well?

However, even having benefitted from a more inclusive upbringing is no guarantee of better understanding. In his forward to the Green Paper the relevant Secretary of State, Mr Sajid Javid, reminisces over translating for his mother in the doctor’s surgery at the age of six. He talks of 'shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities.' But as Tony Blair before him also failed to understand, this phrase about ‘rights and responsibilities’ came from R. H. Tawney and originally meant so much more.

It was Tawney who best described the rights of the poor and the responsibilities of the rich.82 Tony Blair turned the phrase on its head. Mr Blair was also a product of private education. The Green Paper (page 64) proposes a new national survey to ascertain the extent to which people are aware of their 'shared/common rights and responsibilities'. Perhaps the origins of the phrase need to be better studied by those preparing the survey. The entire ‘Measuring Success’ section of the green paper is risible.

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81 I have written about this frequently. Among OECD nations only Chile (and possibly Korea) spends more on its segregated private school children as compared to the UK. See Dorling, D. (2015) Injustice, Bristol: Policy Press, p. 68.
The Green Paper (page 11) begins with an assertion that: ‘As of January 2017, 60% of minority ethnic pupils were in schools where minority ethnic pupils are in the majority.’ In other words, in diverse areas there are diverse schools. In great contrast, the proportion of the children of the richest 5% who are educated where children of the richest 5% are in a majority is, of course, far higher than 60%. And in contrast to mixing by ethnicity in schools, which is increasing over time, there is no evidence that the rich are mixing more.

Similarly, the very rich are extremely geographically isolated living mostly in a small number of neighbourhoods and being part of a declining group of people who can afford to buy their homes outright without a mortgage.

The Green Paper is concerned that 770,000 people, just over 1% of the population, say they cannot speak English well, but makes no mention of the inability of most people to speak a second language, or of Welsh, Gaelic, or Irish.

On page 12 the Green Paper explained: ‘Low levels of meaningful contact between people from different backgrounds can increase levels of mistrust and anxiety, damaging people’s health and well-being and limiting their ability to make the most of the opportunities Britain offers. Negative cultural norms can take hold, including prejudice, anti-social behaviour and oppression of women’

This is all true. We are a divided society because the wrong people are today in power; selfish, individualistic, nasty people from ‘the nasty party’ as Theresa May herself once called it. Until a government not sponsored by the rich and made up almost exclusively of the rich is in power we should not expect progress.

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Neoliberal orthodoxy rests on the belief that ‘human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’. The role of the state at this time is to establish and sustain forms of governance that realise these principles. Thus, emphasis is placed on ‘deregulation, privatisation, and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision’. Neoliberal common-sense also demands that minimal state intervention in the affairs of the market is necessary because the state does not possess the knowledge and expertise required to do so. However, as the discussion below will show, there is one particular sector of British labour market where recent governments have not been shy in their interventions – the public sector.

The present conjuncture is also characterised by widening disparities in both wealth and power. Indeed, it is commonly argued that such inequalities are the result of the decisions taken by individuals, rather than being the outcome of structural processes and institutional arrangements. Political-economic orthodoxy dictates that while not everyone is born equal, individuals have the agency to make choices that will enable them to work their way out of material disadvantage. Individual responsibility and accountability are integral to this orthodoxy.

These are principles underpinning the Green Paper’s proposals for ‘Increasing economic opportunity’:

- The government believes in diagnosing an individual customer’s barriers to employment and providing tailored programmes (page 52).
- The strategy explains how the government will help people of all ages to understand their options and different paths to work, and plan the steps they need to take to get from where they are to where they want to go (page 55).
- The Claimant Commitment clarifies what people are expected to do in return for receiving Universal Credit. As Universal Credit is rolled out, we will expect more people from ethnic minorities to be subject to work related requirements as a condition of receiving Universal Credit (page 52).

These proposals offer little by way of addressing the historical, structural, institutional and entrenched cultural determinants of racial inequality. Indeed, they form a core part of a modern day racial contract which defines the place racialised minority people occupy in this country.

The ‘Race Disparity Audit’ and The Casey Review

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In 2017, Theresa May marked the official launch of the 'Race Disparity Audit' by telling a meeting of ‘key stakeholders’ that:

...when one person works just as hard as another person...but experiences a worse outcome solely on the grounds of their ethnicity, then this is a problem that I believe we have to confront...Britain today in the 21st Century is a diverse multi-ethnic democracy. Diversity is a source of strength and pride for us...[the data we're releasing today] ... It's a world first, no country has ever produced a piece of work looking at the lived experience of people of different ethnicities which is as extensive and ambitious as this...The issues are now out in the open and we all have a responsibility to work together to tackle them...So I think the message is very simple; if the disparities can't be explained, they must be changed...we must recognise that we've come a long way in promoting equality and opportunity... we still have a way to go if we’re truly going to have a country that does work for everyone.

Laced with institutional and national pride, the Prime Minister’s statement did not use the word racism once. It appears only once in the Green Paper. What is more, the section on 'Increasing Economic Opportunity' contains just a single reference to ‘Racial Prejudice’ framed in terms of unconscious bias. This reduces racism to the 'unconscious biases' and 'implicit attitudes' of individuals rather than viewing it as being structural, institutional and cultural in nature.

The nature of workplace racism and impact of everyday workplace racism in Britain has recently been catalogued by the 2015 Business in the Community survey and the 2016/17 Trade Union Congress survey. The former found that 30% of participants had witnessed or experienced racist harassment or bullying in the past year (an increase in the levels of reported 1-2 years ago and 3-5 years ago). What is more, the latter revealed that over 70% of Asian and Black workers had experienced racial harassment at work in the last five years, while around 60% of Asian and Black workers, and almost 40% of employees from a Mixed heritage background, had been treated unfairly by their employer because of their 'race'. A considerable number of TUC survey participants also provided personal statements detailing how workplace racism had both intensified and become more explicit following the EU Referendum and Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. Across both surveys, a significant number of participants also reported experiencing racist violence at work, as well as the severe impact that workplace racism had on their physical and mental health.

Rather than focus solely on the historically entrenched nature of workplace racism and racial inequalities in the labour market, Theresa May, like the Casey Review, frames her announcement in terms of ‘how a person's ethnicity affects their experience in public services' and how the 'ethnicity' of the individual produces a 'worse outcome’. Not only does this type of statement displace racism, it also pathologises ethnic and racial differences. Such terms of reference are also evident in the Green Paper which actually cites The Casey Review when stating that ‘in some communities, cultural

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90 The TUC survey is based on a non-representative survey sample. Therefore, the statistical findings are not generalizable beyond the surveyed population.
attitudes and behaviours are holding women and girls back from fully participating in society’. This is not a comment on the broader nature of sexism and patriarchy. This is a well-honed, non-referential narrative which reinforces Casey’s suggestion that Muslim women are more likely to experience poverty and unemployment as a result of ‘regressive cultural practices’ which are supposedly at odds with ‘British values and sometimes our laws’.

The private sector, non-interventionism and the McGregor-Smith Review

The McGregor-Smith Review was published on 28 February 2017. It calls for further legislation and ‘fully inclusive workplaces where everybody can bring their whole self to work’ initially appear to be a step forward.

However, this starts to feel tangential given the emphasis that McGregor-Smith places on unconscious bias. Moreover, McGregor-Smith also contends that fully utilising ‘BME talent’ has the potential to ‘increase productivity and delivering £24 billion of benefits to the UK economy’. This very point is highlighted in the Government’s official response to the Review. While rejecting the call for additional legislation, the Government argued that a ‘business-led, voluntary approach’ was the ‘best method’ of ‘bringing about lasting change’ and that they ‘will monitor progress and stand ready to act if sufficient progress is not delivered’. Leading voices from the world of business rallied behind the Government, arguing that it is ‘important that we take a business-led approach to plans, targets and reporting systems, rather than a regulatory one’, as well as suggesting that firms ‘do not need a whole new set of paperwork and checklists’.

In the Green Paper, it is argued that, ‘a different approach is required for different sectors...These include developing a simple guide on how to discuss race in the workplace, an online portal of best practice and celebrating success through a list of the top employers for race equality’ (page 53).

Notably, the Green Paper talks of ‘educating’ employers on the benefits of a diverse workforce and encouraging employers to develop mentoring practices, but offers very little by way of holding individual employers to account, particularly in terms of realising equality and how employers responded to handle discrimination in recruitment, career progression, pay, retention and reports of everyday workplace racism.

State intervention in the public sector

While reluctant to regulate the private sector, the state has shown, time and again, that is willing to intervene in the public sector. The Government’s official response to The McGregor-Smith Review notes that the civil service ‘will continue to lead from the front in taking positive action to make... the wider public sector more inclusive’. In contrast to this, both the BITC and TUC surveys reveal that racism remains a resilient feature of everyday working life and institutional practice in the public sector, including the civil service. It is concerning that the Government has handed responsibility

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96 Tovey, Alan. The Daily Telegraph, February 28th 2017 ‘Red tape fears over plan to boost careers of minority groups’. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/02/28/red-tape-fears-plan-boost-careers-minority-groups/.
over to public sector managers to determine ‘how to comply with this new legal duty’, when both the BITC and TUC surveys identify managers as being main perpetrators of workplace racism.

Moreover, the aforementioned surveys raise concern in relation to Conservative’s ‘Code of practice on the English language requirement for public sector workers’,\(^\text{97}\) which was brought into law in fulfilment with promises made in the Conservative’s 2015 General Election Manifesto.\(^\text{98}\) A key aim of this ‘Code’ was to ensure that ‘every public sector worker operating in a customer-facing role must speak fluent English’. This pledge sat alongside a proposal to further ‘toughen requirements for non-EU spouses to join EU citizens, including with an income threshold and English language test’. The Conservative manifesto also noted that during their previous term in office, the coalition Government had ‘introduced tough new language tests for migrants and ensured councils reduce spending on translation services’. Those people who speak other languages are forever framed as being ‘outsiders’ unable to escape the category of ‘immigrant’. This further undermines the very idea that Britain is a multiracial, multicultural and multilingual nation.

The issue of language proficiency also runs through *The McGregor-Smith Review*. Indeed, it noted that around 30% of employers had said that ‘language skills’ were the main factor as to why ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ (BME) people ‘have difficulty in accessing jobs that match their skills’ and why ‘BME’ people do not ‘progress as far as their White counterparts in their careers’. Such views stand in contrast to the latest survey evidence. More specifically, such views problematize the skills and abilities of individuals rather than taking note of the fact that a considerable number of survey participants reported being routinely questioned on their perceived ‘ability to speak English’, while also being pressured into only speaking English at work. What is more, survey respondents also reported that an alleged lack of language proficiency had resulted in discrimination in recruitment, restricted access to training, demotion, and excessive, if not unnecessary, surveillance and scrutiny by managers. Both the BITC and TUC surveys also reveal that such forms of discrimination are commonplace in the public sector.

All told, the latest survey evidence suggests that language proficiency must be addressed as an issue of workplace racism, as opposed to framing people as ‘human resources’ whose inclusion can be exploited in the pursuit of profit. Instead such issues are better framed in terms of employers having both a legal and a moral obligation not to discriminate and to address enduring racial inequality.

If we are serious about addressing workplace racism and racial inequality in the labour market, we need to start by unsettling the guiding principles and institutional frameworks of racial neoliberalism. Doing so is critical if we are to realise McGregor-Smith’s goal of ‘Fully inclusive workplaces…where everybody can bring their whole self to work’.

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Ethnicity and Integration?
Alita Nandi

The objective of this Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper as outlined in the Secretary of State Sajid Javid’s Foreword is “to build strong integrated communities where people – whatever their background – live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities.” Specifically, “…to tackle the inequalities and injustices that hold people back… inequalities that can act as barriers to integration and opportunity, barriers which prevent us from building a Britain where everyone has the chance to succeed” and “to confront the segregation that can divide communities”, as stated by the Prime Minister in her Foreword. The Green Paper sets out the challenges to and strategies for achieving this objective of a unified country.

The integration strategies set out in the Green Paper focus on the role of local institutions and policies to provide better support to ethnic minorities for reducing their economic disadvantage as well as to support and encourage them, particularly those who are living in segregated communities, to integrate with mainstream society. While many of the strategies recommended in the Green Paper are possibly effective and useful, I would like to question some of the recommendations and ask if these are likely to achieve their stated goals.

First, segregation, integration, inequality and disadvantage are defined and discussed in terms of one type of difference – ethnicity. Indeed there is a large body of evidence that most ethnic minority groups have lower employment rates, lower wages, are more concentrated in low paying sectors and jobs, experience higher levels of poverty and are likely to be poor for longer periods. However, across ethnic different ethnic groups, there is also evidence that women, individuals with disabilities, sexual minorities, individuals living in deprived areas, individuals with parents from lower occupational classes are also likely to experience similar economic disadvantage. While the Green Paper mentions some gender and social class differences, ethnicity remains its primary focus. Although the objectives mentioned in the two Forewords do not specify disadvantage and inequality

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of opportunity only in terms of ethnic differences, the rest of the Green Paper seem to have a disproportionate focus on this.

This disproportionate focus on ethnicity does not reckon adequately other disadvantaged groups. It also gives a misleading impression that ethnic groups are homogeneous and individuals in these groups only face barriers due to their ethnic backgrounds. It ignores the fact that ethnic groups comprise of people of different gender, age, social classes, sexual orientations and disabilities and as a result may face multiple disadvantages. Only gender differences within ethnic groups are mentioned in a few instances. Finally, this focus on ethnic groups and the subsequent discussion of segregation in Chapters 3 and 5 make an implicit causal link between ethnic differences and lack of integration in communities and schools.

Second, the Green Paper makes useful suggestions about building shared communities by increasing interaction and contact between different ethnic groups in Chapter 5. These strategies are supported by evidence that contact between individuals of different groups with a common shared goal, reduces prejudice and helps build a more cohesive and unified society. However, this strategy should be useful in reducing inter-group prejudice and bias along other dimensions – gender, age, class, disability, sexual orientation – as well. Thus it is not clear why these integration strategies are only directed at groups based on ethnicity?

Third, the Green Paper seems to suggest that residential and community segregation is being driven by some ethnic minority groups who are less inclined to live alongside white British communities: “There are town and city neighbourhoods where ethnic minority communities are increasing in concentration with growing isolation from White British communities,” (page 12) and, from the Casey Review, “people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to live in more residentially segregated communities than other ethnic minority groups.” There is however no mention here about segregation of the white majority community. There is no discussion either about whether some white majority individuals are choosing not to live in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. We accept that even if all white majority individuals wanted to live in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, it would be difficult for most of them to do so because by definition they are the majority group. But the point is, whether by choice or not, only a small proportion of white majority adults live in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. But this lack of contact with ethnic minority group members may increase their prejudice and bias against minorities and thus reduce social cohesion. In other words, this segregation of white majority communities may have an equally deleterious effect on the integration of British society as the segregation of ethnic minorities.

Fourth, let us examine the claim in this strategy paper that some ethnic minority individuals choose to live with members of their own ethnic group. The Green Paper recognises that this may lead to social networks that fail to provide better economic opportunities. But it does not explore whether living with others of the same ethnic group has some advantages for ethnic minorities and thus incentivises such behaviour. There is evidence that living with co-ethnic members is associated

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with better health.\textsuperscript{104} Among ethnic minorities, the likelihood of being a victim of ethnic and racial harassment in public places is lower for those living in areas with higher proportion of their own ethnic group.\textsuperscript{105} Although the growing number of hate crimes is mentioned in the Green Paper there is hardly any discussion about how to reduce it.

Fifth, there are some useful suggestions for building integrated communities through "shared community spaces", "shared activities through culture and sport" etc. But we know that around one in ten ethnic minorities report being victims of ethnic and racial harassment in public places in the last one year, and a higher proportion avoid or feel unsafe in public places.\textsuperscript{106} It is possible that this may reduce opportunities for ethnic minorities to participate in activities in these public places, activities which could promote integration in neighbourhoods and communities.

Chapter 6 recognises differences in employment opportunities across ethnic groups, and in keeping with rest of the paper hardly mentions differences across other groups. But having said that, the methods suggested in the strategy paper to increase these opportunities, such as providing better training and information to help minorities take advantage of the opportunities available, are very useful. The suggestion of developing tailormade and localised opportunities is also helpful. What is missing here is a substantial and thorough discussion of the evidence on discrimination at the workplace and steps that can be taken to reduce and eliminate it. While racial prejudice and its possible impact on job discrimination is acknowledged by mentioning the Natcen and the Runnymede Trust’s report on Racial Prejudice in Britain, there does not seem to sufficient focus on the role of institutions in contrast to that of individuals. The publication of ethnic differences in public services by the Race Disparity Unit via the Ethnicity Facts and Figures website is a useful first step in this direction.


\textsuperscript{105} Nandi, A. et al. (2016) 'Prevalence and persistence of ethnic and racial harassment and mental health: A longitudinal analysis'. Available at: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/projects/health-and-harassment.

In this article I want to concentrate on the passages in the Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper that specifically refer to the integration of ethnic minority women and young girls. The goal of eliminating barriers to full gender inclusion is repeatedly mentioned as one of the primary objectives of the government’s new approach to integration. But what are the specific barriers identified that hold women and young girls back from integrating in British society? The Green Paper mentions four in particular: (1) Poor mastery of the English language; (2) poor participation in the labour market; (3) “negative” cultural norms that oppress women and (4) forced marriages and lack of clarity concerning marriage norms in the UK.

These four “barriers” to integration are considered particularly acute among women of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnicity, who are often the women mentioned in empirical studies and statistics as less integrated compared to women from other backgrounds.

But let’s see how the Green Paper proposes to tackle the difficulties of integrating these women. Concerning language barriers, the Green Paper proposes to extend to other parts of the country the experience of the community-based English language programme, which had been trialed in 2016 and obtained good results. The idea is to launch a new programme along the same lines, particularly in those areas in which there is a high concentration of people with an insufficient proficiency in English. While it is impossible to assess the impact of the new programme, as it is still in the future tense and it will depend on how it will be implemented, concern has been expressed over the Government’s approach towards one of the key initiatives delivering English courses for ethnic minorities: i.e., the Adult Education Budget.

Recently, the Government decided to devolve responsibility for the Adult Education Budget to eight Mayoral Combined Authorities (MCAs) and the Greater London Authority (GLA). The Adult Education Budget is one of the most important providers of English classes for ethnic minorities. While the devolution route was justified on the basis of the benefits that might derive from the possibility of tailoring these programmes according to local needs, combined authorities at the receiving end fear that the funding for the transition period will be inadequate and the timescales for the handing over of powers too challenging. Furthermore, as Maya Goodfellow reports in her article in this issue, government funding for English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) in England registered a 60% drop since 2010.

The second major obstacle to the integration of ethnic minority women identified by the Green Paper is their low rates of activity in the labour market. To provide evidence for this point the document resorts, among others, to a study on the “individual attitudes” of women of different origins towards gender roles and work. In other words, although the reasons for ethnic minority women’s low levels of participation in the labour market are not entirely clarified, the document

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107 Allen-Kinross, Pippa. FE Week, February 28th 2018. 'Mayors raise concerns over weak adult education budget devolution powers'. Available at: https://feweek.co.uk/2018/02/23/mayors-raise-concerns-over-weak-adult-education-budget-devolution-powers/

seems to suggest that their own, subjective attitudes – which might derive from their cultural backgrounds – coupled with their poor English proficiency, are responsible for holding them back from actively seeking a job. The solutions identified are rather vague – amounting to the idea that “diagnosing an individual customer’s barriers to employment and providing a tailored approach” is better than working on more structural programmes (p. 52) – and thereby reflect the philosophy that the lack of integration in the labour market is fundamentally an individual problem which is rooted in a negative individual attitude towards work.

It is interesting here to note that the Green Paper does not mention a document that had been made available in October 2017 by the Women’s Budget Group and Runnymede Trust on “The Impact of Austerity on Black and Minority Ethnic Women in the UK”. According to this study – which relies on both statistical data as well as qualitative interviews – the hindrances to the economic participation of ethnic minority women are above all systemic and structural. First, ethnic minority women tend to belong to the poorest segment of British society. In the case of mothers, the prohibitive costs of childcare for preschool age children and the misrecognition by the Sanctions Regime of their caring responsibilities as “work” mean that these women either have little time or cannot afford to actively seek for a job. Second, discrimination in the labour market has been widely demonstrated to be a major problem for ethnic minority women. Studies show that employers still tend to prefer white workers or “British” sounding names to ethnic minorities, particularly for the most qualified jobs. Third, ethnic minority women tend to be concentrated in the “health and social care” niche of the labour market and in the worse paying jobs, which also tend to be more precarious. A serious and equitable approach to the economic integration of ethnic minority women must address the high costs of childcare in England (the highest in the world according to the OECD), the levels of discrimination to which they are subjected (which are exacerbated by the xenophobic climate the Government has fueled) and the fact that it is not enough to improve access to the labour market if the jobs that are available are badly paid and precarious. The whole labour market organization should be changed, starting from the drastic improvement of wages, workers’ rights and conditions.

I will consider the third and fourth aforementioned barriers together as they fundamentally point to the same problem: the unequal treatment of ethnic minority women and forms of oppression in marriage that can derive from these women’s cultural/ethnic heritage. The Green Paper proposes to “empower marginalized women” by improving understanding “of the ways in which overseas influences can undermine attitudes to rights and freedoms in the UK” and “exploring reform of the law on marriage and religious weddings” (p. 15). While these proposals are still indefinite, what is clear is that those ethnic minority women (and women more generally) who are subject to abuse and domestic violence will find it harder to seek help in a context in which almost 20% of domestic violence refuges have been closed since 2010 following the budget cuts. As Julie Cooper reported to the House of Commons in 2016: “Thirty-two of the domestic violence services that have closed since 2010 were specialist services for black and minority ethnic women. The closure of these services is dangerous for all women, particularly those who rely on specialist domestic violence

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services, such as women of colour or trans women”. The fight against misogyny and women’s oppression within ethnic minority communities cannot be based on an ethnicised (and ultimately stereotypical) understanding of gender inequality as a “cultural” problem. It is vital to provide victims of gender oppression and violence with the infrastructures that enable them to subtract themselves from these situations.

Overall, the Green Paper's approach to the integration of ethnic minority women (and to the integration of ethnic minorities and migrants more generally) reflects the wider approach developed at the EU level since the mid 2000s. Integration is increasingly casted as a “duty” and a certifiable “result” (rather than an opportunity and a process) that foreigners must achieve in order to demonstrate their good will to be part of their “hosting” societies. In other words, even though integration is called a two-way process that involves and engages the hosting society and institutions just as much as the migrants and ethnic minorities themselves, integration policies in reality emphasise the subjective resolve of individuals from ethnic minorities. Accordingly, if what is deemed to be integration is not achieved, ultimately it is their fault, while the wider structural impediments that prevent ethnic minorities and migrants from being included in society are not really taken into account. However, it is precisely those structural problems – the racist biases present in the labour and housing markets, the neoliberal cuts to vital social services and language courses, the absence of public and free facilities for the care of children and the elderly – that make the process of integration particularly difficult for ethnic minority men and women.

Women have been put increasingly at the center of integration policies in recent years all across the continent. Not only are women the mothers of the future generations, and thereby key to the inclusion and “acculturation” of the whole family and community, but they are also increasingly key potential or actual workers in the growing social care and health sector. It is thus not surprising that so much emphasis is put on their integration. The barriers to integration, however, are seldom of an “individual” nature: they speak of the material obstacles, prejudices and inequalities that are present in our societies. Any proposal that does not confront the challenge of integration at this structural level is fundamentally misguided and destined to fail.

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113 As previous footnote.

A striking aspect of the 2016 Casey Review is the prominent role of transnational marriage in its portrayal of problematic integration among British South Asian Muslims. Casey stresses the significance of spousal immigration from the subcontinent as a source of permanent settlement of migrants to the UK, and draws both explicit and implied connections between high levels of ‘foreign-born partners’ and a wide range of integration issues. Newspaper coverage of the Casey Review picked up on this emphasis, with the Telegraph’s headline reading: ‘Muslims are failing to integrate because men keep marrying abroad, major report warns’.115

The 2018 Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper builds on the Casey Review’s critique of transnational marriage, this time framed as problematic in terms of ‘rights and freedoms’. The discussion focusses in particular on British Pakistanis, and on consanguinity and transnational cultural influence. Cousin marriages ‘are detrimental where they restrict individuals’ right to choose’, while transnational connections ‘present challenges to integration where social or cultural norms overseas differ from British values’. As the Green Paper also proposes, both renewed restrictions to spousal immigration, and working with voluntary organisations ‘on issues around first-cousin marriages’, the inference is that British Pakistani transnational cousin marriages are among the ‘socio-cultural norms which can hold women and girls back’, and which the new strategy plans to challenge.

Family life is protected in international human rights agreements,116 and can only be interfered with on certain grounds – not merely because a State wishes to limit immigration. The 2012 introduction of an £18,600 minimum income requirement was justified by suggesting that it would promote integration, but in its section on ‘Immigration for Family/Marriage Reasons’, the Casey Review cites the resulting reduction in migrants coming to the UK to join family as a sign of ‘policy success’. After widespread criticism of previous governmental approaches to spousal immigration,117 the stigmatizing representations of South Asian transnational marriage in these documents feel rather like groundhog day, but the open admission of reducing family reunification as the underlying policy goal is surprising. Given the sensitivity of these issues, attempts to develop wider policies around integration should clearly be disentangled from immigration control agendas.

Both documents use the memorable phrase ‘first generation in every generation’ to evoke adverse implications of transnational marriage for integration. Whilst this phrase, taken from David Goodhart’s controversial book The British Dream,118 is both catchy and intuitive, it is not neutral. It implies a negative view of immigration, and is a temporal trope suggesting the arrival of a family member drags social progress back from the values of modern Britain to an overseas

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115 Swinford, Steven, The Telegraph, December 6th 2016. ‘Muslims are failing to integrate because men keep marrying abroad, major report warns’. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/05/muslim-communities-remain-isolated-men-keep-marrying-foreign/.


Low levels of paid employment amongst Pakistani migrant wives are well known. Refraining from paid employment in order to focus on domestic and caring responsibilities is not unusual amongst women in Britain, but only tends to be read as an integration problem in certain ethnic (and class) contexts. The social and economic contribution made by caring for children and elders, and wider reproductive labour supporting households, should not be undervalued. But alongside migrant women content to fulfil a domestic role, the MMI project documents others keen to use their education in the labour market (one in six migrant wives from Pakistan are graduates), or developing employment aspirations after seeing British Pakistani women working. Their opportunities may however be constrained by domestic responsibilities and expectations; discrimination; lack of access to student loans to enable qualifications to be gained or converted; and lack of knowledge of job markets and language skills. The latter can of course be acquired, but marriage migrants simultaneously enter both a new country and a phase of the life course focussed on family and raising children, in which time and finances for undertaking training may be scarce. A parallel observation can be made of migrant husbands, who have high rates of employment, but often work long hours in low-paid jobs in order to provide for their new families.

The Green Paper’s recognition of time and lifestage constraints on language learning, and suggestion of more funding for English language courses are therefore to be warmly welcomed. Such training must however be free for all (low income should never be a barrier to learning English) and available across the country rather than subject to a postcode lottery of local authority priorities or ‘Integration Areas’. Equally, the provision of practical information on services and opportunities before or on arrival seems a sensible measure, and would reduce migrant spouses’ reliance on in-laws. Both are also among the recommendations drawn from our research.120

Relationships between transnational marriage and processes of integration are sometimes counter-intuitive. In Angela Dale’s 2008 research with British South Asian women married to men from the Indian subcontinent, several women suggested that migrant husbands prevent their British wives from working121 – just the kind of ‘socio-cultural norms which can hold women back’ to which the Green Paper may be referring. But the same women also observed that their own husbands were not like that, and our own analysis of the Labour Force Survey data confirms the finding that British South Asian women married to migrants do not actually have lower levels of employment than co-ethnics married to partners from the UK. Whilst community consultation such as that undertaken for the Casey Review is therefore valuable, the outcomes must be triangulated with other data. Indeed, in our research, we encountered some British Pakistani women whose marriages to migrants enhanced rather than reduced their autonomy – exempt from expectations to live with in-laws (who remained in Pakistan), they were able to pursue other aspirations.

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119 See: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/mmi/
120 See: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/mmi/
The Integrated Communities Green Paper also comes very close to conflating transnational cousin marriage with forced marriage (echoing Danish policy under which spousal visa applications involving cousins are automatically rejected, presumed forced\textsuperscript{122}). Whilst coerced marriages do occur and are a matter to be taken seriously, the majority of transnational marriages are not forced. Most involve at least some degree of parental arrangement, but some are initiated by the couple themselves, as young British Pakistanis on visits to Pakistan have the opportunity to form attractions at extended family gatherings. Indeed, Queen Elisabeth II’s marriage to a foreign-born second cousin whom she reportedly first met at an overseas family wedding could be a British Pakistani story (with some minor changes to names and circumstances).\textsuperscript{123} The Green Paper throws in a mention of genetic issues in its portrayal of cousin marriages as ‘detrimental’, and consanguinity does increase the likelihood of congenital abnormalities, but only to the level of risk for children of White British mothers over the age of 34.\textsuperscript{124} As Alison Shaw has pointed out,

No politician has ever suggested that women over 34 should not be allowed to marry or should be strongly discouraged from reproducing because they are twice more likely than younger women to have children with birth anomalies. To make this argument would undoubtedly be seen as an attack on individual freedom.\textsuperscript{125}

Given the emphasis of both the Casey Review and Integrated Communities on both transnational marriage and ‘influences from overseas’, it is worth saying something about the relationship - or lack of relationship - between the two. In our interviews, British Pakistanis married to migrants were, unsurprisingly, more likely to visit Pakistan than those without in-laws to visit, but migrant spouses often travelled to visit family in Pakistan without their British partner. British Pakistanis married to migrants were no less likely than those with a UK-born spouse to stress their Britishness, and were not more likely to describe themselves as highly religious – indeed some British spouses were more religiously observant than their migrant partners. Migrant spouses did use their ‘mother tongue’ at home, and keep up with media from ‘back home’ – but that did not mean that other family members did not speak English, or that they wouldn’t watch ‘British’ telly with the kids. In other words, we did not find strong evidence of a causal relationship between British Pakistanis marrying transnationally and developing transnational identification or adopting ‘foreign’ cultural practices.


\textsuperscript{123} Hodgkin, Emily. November 15\textsuperscript{th} 2017. The Express 'This is how Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip met (when she was only 13)'. Available at: https://www.express.co.uk/life-style/life/880057/Queen-Elizabeth-ii-wedding-Prince-Philip.


One surprising aspect of both the Casey Review and Integrated Communities reports is that both cited the Marriage Migration and Integration project’s report data about the proportions of British Pakistanis marrying overseas, but neither makes reference to the empirical findings of the report, preferring instead to gloss over these complexities. The problem with this, as with all overly simplified portrayals of ethnic group family practices, is that it risks reinforcing negative stereotypes - and negative stereotypes are hardly conducive to integration. Rather, they are likely to worsen the social barriers and discrimination which impede both social interaction between groups, and opportunities for new migrants and minority group citizens alike. Ten years ago, Dustin and Phillips wrote in response to previous controversies over government approaches to forced marriage that ‘It has to be possible to address abuses of women without in the process promoting stereotypes of culture.’ Equally, in developing an Integration Strategy, it should be possible to provide services to assist the integration of spousal migrants, without in the processes perpetuating homogenising stereotypes of the family practices of entire ethnic groups.

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126 The Marriage Migration and Integration project (2012-15) was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [Grant Number ES/K006495/1]. A collaboration between the Universities of Bristol and Oxford, it used data from the UK Labour Force Survey in combination with interviews and focus groups with British Pakistani Muslims and British Indian Sikhs and their spouses. The full project report and shorter briefing paper can be downloaded here: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/mmi/. Thanks are due to the research participants, and the other members of the Marriage Migration and Integration research team: Sarah Spencer, Hiranthi Jayaweera, Marta Bolognani, Evelyn Ersanilli and Melanie Griffiths.

It’s almost like clockwork – every few years the ‘segregation’ debate arises and with it question of the English language.\textsuperscript{128} The narrative tends to be: people of colour or in particular certain women of colour don’t speak English - it’s damaging ‘them’ and ‘us’.

The Government’s Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper states ‘770,000 people in England aged 16 and over say they cannot speak English well or at all; and women are disproportionately affected.’ This received extensive publicity when Sajid Javid, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, wielding the example of his own mother, made it national news. From the Guardian to the Daily Mail,\textsuperscript{129} Javid had supposedly ‘revealed’ the number of people who don’t speak English. Except, the figures he was referring to weren’t news – they were taken from the 2011 census and reported on when the data was released in 2013.\textsuperscript{130} Javid explained his mother from Pakistan learned English fifteen years after coming to the UK, and it transformed her life. The reason for this anecdote: Javid said ‘most’ of the people who say they have little or no English skills are women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. The Green Paper makes a slightly different claims - “Pakistani (18.9\%) and Bangladeshi (21.9\%) groups have the highest proportions of people aged 16 or over with poor English language proficiency.”

But to get to this figure, the Green Paper uses the 2011 census and combines two different categories in the data: ‘don’t speak well’ or ‘don’t speak at all’. One of the problems with relying on this data for a news story, a Green Paper and a national strategy is self-reporting doesn’t necessarily produce reliable results: people might say they can’t speak English very well, but the reality might be different. The data suggests the number of people who couldn’t speak English at all is nearer to 18,000, that is 0.3\% of the population.

On closer inspection, if census data on different ethnic groups alone is going to inform policy, there’s a problem with how it breaks this down.\textsuperscript{131} White and mixed are lumped together as one category, while other ‘ethnic groups’ are broken down. But even if you look at this you find the number of white and mixed women who say they don’t speak English at all is 26,081, in comparison to 17,695 women of Pakistani origin and 9,879 Bangladeshi women – proportionately it might be more but

\begin{footnotes}\footnote{128}{See, for example, BBC News, December 5\textsuperscript{th} 2016. ‘Segregation at ‘worrying levels’ in parts of Britain, Dame Louise Casey warns’. The report is accompanied by a photo of three women wearing burqas. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38200989.} \footnote{129}{Asthana, Anushka, The Guardian, March 14\textsuperscript{th} 2018, ‘Sajid Javid: 770,000 people in England unable to speak English well’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/14/sajid-javid-770000-people-in-england-not-able-to-speak-english; Harding Eleanor, Daily Mail, March 15\textsuperscript{th} 2018, ‘Sajid Javid reveals 770,000 migrants don’t speak English as he pledges £50million to boost learning’. Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5502967/Sajid-Javid-reveals-770-000-migrants-dont-speak-English.html.} \footnote{130}{See, for example, BBC News, January 30\textsuperscript{th} 2013. ‘138,000 speak no English – census’. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21259401.} \footnote{131}{ONS ‘CT0558_2011 Census - Ethnic group by proficiency in English by sex by age - 2011 Census merged local authorities in England’. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/adhocs/005194ct05582011censusesethnicgroupbyproficiencyinenglishbysexbyage2011censusemergedlocalauthoritiesinengland.}}
**Discovered Society**

**Integrated Communities**

**48**

**Discover Society**

**I**n
tegrated communities statistically it’s not; it’s disproportionate but it’s certainly not ‘most’, as Javid claimed. Honing in on these women feeds the stereotype that Asian women are voiceless and powerless.

While the Green Paper didn’t make the same assertion as Javid, it seems to ignore this complexity – by picking out that a higher proportion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people don’t speak English it glosses over white and mixed, which allows for an assumption that these minorities need to ‘integrate’ better or should solely be the focus of English classes. It clears the way for Javid’s comments. Numbers seem reliable; quantitative studies neutral but they are deeply political.

Though the report outlines the numerous ways the government supports people to participate in ESOL there is no accounting for the cuts that have taken place since 2010. According to Refugee Action, government funding for English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) in England dropped from £203million in 2010 to £90million in 2016, amounting to a real term cut of 60%. Migrant and refugee groups have pointed out that access to ESOL would also be helped by making it flexible – many people who might like to use it can work long, unconventional hours. They might have childcare needs or need mental health support, areas that have also been cut extensively.

The Green Paper explains why it’s homed in on English: ‘Poor English language skills limit an individual’s employment opportunities, their ability to mix, their civic participation and their access to services, hindering independence, confidence and self-determination’. Let’s start with the labour market. The Green Paper draws from analysis that shows ‘those with low proficiency in English were less likely to be employed and more likely to be economically inactive than people with high English proficiency levels’. This formulation implies proposals to learn English are predominantly for the ‘good’ of the people who will access these services. Except the problem with this is it uses the census data and takes into account few other potentially significant variables. We can’t necessarily extrapolate that English is the only factor here: correlation doesn’t equal causation.

The report states that boosting English skills are “fundamental to being able to take advantage of the opportunities of living in modern Britain such as getting a job.” It is not that English language is unimportant, but that this is not the only or necessarily the most significant factor when thinking about people in minority ethnic groups – particularly women of colour – being able to participate in the labour market. The majority of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women who don’t speak English are over 65 or 45-64, though of course they should have the opportunity to learn English, it makes no sense to suggest this is going to drastically alter labour market outcomes.

The Runnymede Trust shows that, alongside English, some of the other significant barriers for people of colour getting jobs are trust and engagement with institutions - including political participation. And labour market inequalities are classed and racialised: under government cuts women of colour have been hit the hardest, a disproportionate number of households of colour live in poverty and there is a wealth of evidence showing institutional racism shapes the labour market.

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132 Refugee Action, October 6th 2017. ‘New research: English language provision ’not fit for purpose’ as refugees wait up to three years to start lessons’. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/6179-2/.


“Everyone living in England should be able to speak and understand English,” the report tells us, “so they can integrate into life in this country by…becoming part of community life and making friendships with people from different backgrounds.” The suggestion that lack of English is a significant causal factor in ‘segregation’ is a tired old tune – in 2011 David Cameron said immigrants who couldn’t speak English created a “kind of discomfort and disjoinedness” and in 2002 New Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett advised migrants to speak English at home to avoid “schizophrenic” fissures in their families.

Except there’s no evidence for this. The research cited in this section of the Green Paper argues “poorer command of English significantly leads immigrants to live in language enclaves” but it also explains “there is weak evidence that English skills impact residency in ethnic, country-of-birth or world region’s enclaves”.136 Though this research asserts learning English will reduce segregation it does not demonstrate that – so-called “language enclaves” mean segregation, particularly when they are diverse in other ways. Indeed, this might support other evidence that shows segregation on the whole is not increasing; in terms of geo-spatial segregation, it is white British people who are the most segregated.137 It is unclear why people living in areas that also speak the same language is negative – when the report says people should be mixing with others from different backgrounds, perhaps we should be asking who specifically does it mean?

The report states “not being able to speak English may also exacerbate feelings of loneliness and isolation and prevent people – often women – from seeking help if they are subject to violence or abuse.” This may be true but there is no evidence given for this. Evidence suggests English language is certainly not the only factor in women seeking help if they are subject to violence or abuse –women who speak English face stigmatisation and not being believed about their abuse, as well as fearing their partners. Women of colour in particular have lost vital access to tailored services that are tailored to their specific needs and there is no consideration of how women who have immigrated to the UK and are reliant on their partner for their visa might fear deportation if they report domestic violence.138 Unsupported statements like the above seem to be based on stereotypes about people of colour, where ‘culture’ is subbed for ‘race’ to assume an innate patriarchal backwardness.

Learning English should not be or even seem like a punitive measure, and discussions around state-provided English classes need not feed racialised narratives about ‘segregation’. This debate cannot be disconnected from an imperial politics where English as a global lingua franca supposedly signifies British superiority and ‘true’ Britishness, and so any proposals about English classes must pay attention to this. In 2016, when asked what she thought of David Cameron’s announcement that migrant spouses who failed English language tests might be asked to the UK, Parveen Sadiq replied: “the English invaded more than half the world. Of the countries that they ruled, how many languages do the English speak?”139

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139 As reported by Bowden, George, Huffington Post, March 9th 2016, ‘Muslim Women Speak Out On English Language Requirements, Integration, And Extremism’: Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2016/03/09/muslim-women-english-language-integration-extremism_n_9415904.html.
The Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper talks a lot about classes – particularly language classes – but does not discuss class, as social class. Problems among the white community are described as relating to White British disadvantaged pupils (our emphasis), but even these are somewhat glossed over, whilst the picture on employment needs further refinement as it reflects historic class-based differentials. In this response we draw on available literature and data, and the ongoing ethnographic research of one of us (Brown) to scrutinise the education and employment analysis used in the Green Paper.

**Education**

The Green Paper (p. 26) states that, "overall gaps in educational achievement by ethnic group have narrowed considerably over the last 20 years", but its indirect evidence for this finding opens with a concern about the educational outcomes of white working class pupils, whilst the primary source emphasises that for pupils entitled to FSMs that all ethnic minority pupils outperform white British pupils, a gap that may be widening. Kirby and Cullinane discuss a possible contribution from "cultural and curricular norms" which Brown's ongoing research confirms as a lower aspiration among rural white children to attend university.

Graduate qualifications are particularly associated with doing well in the labour market so it may also be significant that the proportions with degree-level qualifications are higher among ethnic minority groups than for the white population (see Table 1). If we look at younger people there is a clear social class gradient for obtaining a degree, with about twice as many graduates from a professional class background as from those with intermediate or routine jobs, with a ratio greater than 2:1 for the white group. This class gradient was also present for the other (non-white) ethnic groups, but shallower.

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140 A case study on page 29 slips though in allowing a now-merged school to be described as having pupils from a "White British working class background"


Moreover, “between 2007/08 and 2015/16, the number and percentage of undergraduate entrants decreased for the White ethnic group, but increased for all other ethnic groups”. The social mobility ‘coldspots’ identified by the, particularly ‘remote rural or coastal areas’, have below-average proportions of minority ethnic groups.

Labour market outcomes

If the white population is falling behind on educational qualifications, why do they continue to enjoy an advantage in the labour market? There are three main reasons. First, the advantage in employment rates is associated with poorer earnings progression and slightly lower occupational status. Second, the employment advantage is mostly sustained by a higher social class family background which, it seems likely, will not be sustained for future generations. Third, ethnic minority groups face discrimination in the labour market. Differences in social capital or in ‘softer’ (non-academic) skills could also play a role.

We confirm a sizeable ethnic employment penalty. As Figure 1 shows, for younger men and women the White population are the most likely to be in paid employment (ages 16-29 shown, although the pattern holds throughout the age range).

However, the rate of employment is only one measure of labour market success. Analysis of the Annual Population Surveys also shows that white employees were among the least likely to be working in professional/managerial occupations (NSSEC group 1/7), and the most likely to be working in the ‘routine’ occupations (NSSEC group 7/7), for both men and women. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, the white population’s earnings (median hourly pay) are typical for men, at best, whilst for women the hourly earnings of the white population tend to be lower than for those in other ethnic groups.

Table 1: Proportion of 25 year-olds with degrees by social class of family at age 13/14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family class background</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani, Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Any other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof / mgnr, routine</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total degree 25% 40% 29% 49% 30% 48% 27%

Source: own analysis of ‘Next Step’ waves 1 and 8,* previously known as the Youth Cohort Survey or the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE).

* Data from ‘Next Steps’ was supplied by the UK Data Service. University College London. UCL Institute of Education. Centre for Longitudinal Studies. (2018). Next Steps: Sweeps 1-8, 2004-2016. [data collection]. 14th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 5545, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5545-6. We thank these groups, and the respondents providing data, but only we are responsible for the interpretations made here.

Moreover, “between 2007/08 and 2015/16, the number and percentage of undergraduate entrants decreased for the White ethnic group, but increased for all other ethnic groups”. The social mobility ‘coldspots’ identified by the, particularly ‘remote rural or coastal areas’, have below-average proportions of minority ethnic groups.

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Figure 1: The White population is the most likely to be in paid work aged 16-29


Figure 2: The earnings of the White population are barely average (aged 16-29) or below average (for women)

The employment advantage is associated with the higher class background of White young people. After controlling for that – see Table 2 – there is little White advantage for those from professional backgrounds. For those aged 25, over one-third (34%) of the white group had a managerial or professional family background, compared with only 10% of the Pakistani/Bangladeshi group and 22% for those identifying as being of Indian ethnic group. But, as noted above, there is not the same class advantage for younger workers.

Table 2: Proportion of 25 year-olds in paid work by social class of family at age 13/14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family class background</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani, Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Any other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof / mgnr, routine</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate, routine</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total in paid work 79% 73% 74% 81% 75% 67% 79%

Source: own analysis of ‘Next Step’ waves 1 and 8.
Last, the white population were the least likely to have found their jobs using either Agencies or education-based advice, and among the most likely to have gained their job using personal contacts (analysis of Next Steps wave 8). This indicates a role for social capital, or perhaps non-academic skills.

It also seems that the White population are experiencing some ‘subjective’ concerns as a potential result of lower social mobility. As shown in Figure 3, the younger White population were the least likely to agree that ‘Britain is a place where hard work is rewarded’ or that it is easier for them to improve things than their parents’ generation.

Figure 3: Attitudes of 25 year-olds by ethnic group.

Source: ‘Next Steps’ wave 8.
Sociologists have long been interested in the transition of young people into the labour market, males especially. Ongoing research (Brown) suggests that many lower-achieving students have a work-based focus, with perhaps an ‘instant gratification’ attitude to working and bringing in money at a younger age (for instance around cars, particularly in rural areas). The majority of AS level student participants in Brown’s current study noted a strong sense of competition in both driving or causing them to reject expectation in education.

The Green Paper has laudable aims in attempting to bring communities together. However, it tends to downplay the strong and impressive progress already made towards gaining academic qualifications, apart from among the White population (and particularly for those from a working class background).

There remains an overall ethnic minority penalty in the labour market, contra to the educational progress and this relates to employment rates though not to the quality of work. Part of success in employment is also related to interaction with families and peers which may well be shaped by cultural differences. This may contribute to the ethnic minority ‘penalty’. Working class culture may be more conducive to conforming to the labour market than to the educational system, but overall success in rates of employment should not stop further investigation of the occupational profiles of those jobs and the opportunities for progression, nor the exclusion of some groups through discrimination.

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